Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the revival of economic and monetary union. EP Working Documents, document 437/78, 13 November 1978 by Ardwick, Lord
European Communities · ifL/1. 31 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1978 - 1979 
13 November 1978 DOCUMENT 437 /78 
Report 
drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
on Tvival of economic and monetary union 
Rapporteur: Lord ARDWICK 
/,) ./ 
PE 52 .839 
English Edition 

On 17 ~anuary 1978 the President of the European Parliament, pursuant 
to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure, referred the motion for a resolution 
tabled by ;1r Mfiller-Hermann and others on behalf of the Christian-Democratic 
Group on the revival of economic and monetary union to the Committee on 
Economic a1,d Monetary Affairs as the committee responsible and to the 
Committee 0n Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport for its 
opinion. 
On 21 February 1978 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Lord Ardwick rapporteur. 
It consiJered this proposal at its meeting of 20/21 February, 
2/3 March, 18/19 April~ 25/26 May and 19/20 June 1978. 
On 4 July 1978, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
motion for a resolution tabled by .Mr Anequer and others on behalf of the 
European Progressive Democrats on economic and monetary union was referred 
to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and Education, 
the Committee en Budgets and the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional 
Planning and Transport for their opinions. 
On 25 September 1978 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
confirmed tte appointment of Lord Ardwick as rapporteur. 
It coi,sidered the two motions for resolutions at its meetings of 
18/19 Sept~mber, 17/18 and 30/31 October 1978. 
At its meeting of 31 October 1978 the committee adopted the motion for 
a resolution unanimously. 
Present: Mr Pisani, chairman; Mr Notenboom and Sir Brandon Rhys-
Williams, vicH-chairmen; Lord Ardwick, rapporteur; Mr Damseaux, 
Mr Deschamp~, Mr Glinne, Mr H.-w. Mfiller, Mr Normanton, Mr Schyns (deputizing 
for Mr De :{eersmaeker), Mr Stetter, Mr Verhaegen (deputizing for Mr van der 
Gun) and Ml Zywietz. 
The opinions of the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and 
Transport and the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and Education, are 
attached. 
The opinion of the Committee on Budgets will be published separately. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the followi.hg motion for a resolution. together with 
explanatory s~atement: 
~ION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the revival of economic and monetary union 
The European Parliament. 
- having regard to its resolution of 11 March 1976 on the Coamunity of 
stability and growth1• 
having regard to the motion for a resolution on the revival of economic 
and monetilry union tabled by the Christian-Democratic Group (Doc. 496/77). 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution on economic and monetary 
union tahied by the Group of European Progressive Democrats (Doc. 209/78). 
- having re3ard to the initiatives taken at the European Council in Bremen, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional 
P.lanning and Transport. the Committee on Social Affairs. Employment and 
Education a~d the Committee on Budgets (Doc. 437/78). 
1. Recalls that in 1972 the governments of both old and new Member States 
committed themselves to complete full monetary union by 1980; 
2. Deplores the lack of political will and· the subsequent econoai.c 
difficulties which prevented the implementation of this policy. adopted 
in 1972 ; 
3. Considers that the international scale of the crisis and the interpene-
tration of the econoai.es of the Member States prevent any one country 
from overcoai.ng the economic and social crisis on its own; recognizes 
that in ipite of national efforts. the continuance of the economic 
recession. accompanied by a structural crisis. is now a powerful 
argumeo; for a determined new effort to make progress towards economic 
and monetary union; 
4. considers that the first steps must be taken towards ec011omic and 
aonetary uni:m and that this is feasible even if a a>netary union based 
on a single European currency cannot be envisaged from the outset: 
5. Views in this light the Bremen proposal for the introduction of a 
European -;nonetary system to minimize fluctuations in C~ity 
currenci~s, thereby establishing a zone of stability characterized by 
converging economic and monetary policies designed to promote higher 
growth rates and an improvement in the employment situation; 
1 OJ Ho. C 79. 5.4.1976. p. 27 
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6. Stre,ses that for a European monetary system to be workable and, 
more important still, to lead to economic and monetary union, it 
must be accompanied by immediate national and Community economic 
polici~s designed to further the convergence of Member States' 
econom~es with a reduction of regional and social disparities: 
this wonlcl require the European monetary system to be organized 
in such a way that exchan_ge ra~e stability is encouraged by the 
im_prc,ve1,1ent of credit mech~nisms a_nd transf.E;_lrs of resources within 
the Co~munit_y as a means of promoting self-he],,p; 
7. Points out that the reduction of regional and social disparities will 
be made considerably easier by a high rate of economic growth and that 
such growth will be encouraged by completing the construction of a 
real common market by removing all remaining barriers to trade between 
Member States ; 
8. Emphaeiz~s that even the establishment of a European monetary system 
must be thoroughly prepared, recalling that governments of Member States 
enterE"d into the original EMU commitment without havinq fully 
appre.ciated the conditions and obli_gations which would need to be 
f u lf i l!.ed. 
9. Realizes that full monetary union with a single currency or irrevocably 
fixed pa.rir.ies is sharply differentiated from the transitional phase 
now envisaged, in that full union would require technical and political 
control ever money supply and other macro-economic policies to be 
exercis~d by stronger central Community institutions, under the control 
of th~ ~uropean Parliament,instead of by natic:nal governments; 
10. Notes, finally, that even a Euro_p~an monetary s_ystem which is not 
based on a single Euro12ean currency :i;-e.quires mut\l~l;I.y adjusted economic 
and monetary policies( failing which a fur~he.!:_ _setbaqk must be 
expected; this would have even more se~ious imBlications than the 
setback oi: ·the Werner plan had for the desired progress of the 
Community ~owards greater integration, improved economic efficiency 
and thns yolitical solidarity ; 
- 6 - PE 52.839/fin. 
11. Inst:cncts its President to forward this resolution and the report 
of it;; committee to the Council and Commission of the European 
Conm1•mities. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
FOREWORD 
Some people use the term 'ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION' loosely. They 
mean by ~c any substantial measure of economic and monetary integration. 
In Lhis report, the term EMU will be used strictly to mean a union in 
which a single currency replaces the currencies of Member States and is 
supported by the necessary economic and financial policies. 
EMU of tt,is kind, the complete EMU to which the President of the 
Commission aspires.requires at least the framework of a federal system. 
It implies a central monetary authority ultimately responsible to a 
central po \ itical institution. 
It irnplies that the Member States give up their power to conduct 
national macro-economic monetary and budgetary policies. 
It implies that they must accept uniform, or almost uniform corpor a te 
and personal taxation; otherwise a single-currency Europe with free capital 
movement would consist of competing tax-havens. 
Thus EM"J would require considerable national sacrifices in return for 
the prospectively great collective benefits. 
Nobody, however, proposes to go to complete EMU in one giant stride. 
There mus, be what M. Pierre Werner, the accoucheur of EMU, has described 
as a pre-:,nion stage. And this, in itself, both demands and promises 
solutions t.o some of the major problems of the current crises. 
In the pre-union stage a system must be reached of stable though not 
irreversibly fixed parities. At the same time budgetary, monetary and 
fiscal policies must be coordinated. There must also be mutual aid for 
Member States with currency difficulties. And there must be a significant 
attempt to s~ooth out regional inequalities. 
ThesP- are, broadly, the aims of the resolution tabled by Mr MUller-
Hermann anJ his Christian Democratic colleagues; and also of the 
Commission's Five Year Programme sponsored by Mr Ortoli. They are also 
more or less in line with proposals that have been made by Mr Werner and 
Mr Marjolin. And they are echoed by the Bremen proposals for a European 
monetary system. 
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CHAPTER I 
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
EXPLANATION: INTRODUCTION 
1. Mr Jenki~s seized the opportunity at his lecture in Florence, in June 
1977, to revive the debate on economic and monetary union and to assert . 
that it wo,1ld help member countries to raise t _heir living standards and 
lower their inflation and their unemployment figures. He was encouraged 
to do so because early in the year Messrs Giscard and Schmidt had shown a 
reawakened interest in the subject. 
2. The time may also have seemed ripe because the worst of the recession 
which had started four years before was now over, and the enlarged 
Community was on the point of completing the customs union. A new stage 
of the Community's development was necessary. 
3. The Pr~sjdent of the Commission was also moved by his fear that unless 
the centrai economic weakness of the Community could be overcome, its 
external c~hesion might not be retained. Moreover, its progress would be 
halted just as it was facing the strains of the further enlargement. 
4. The idea of EMU was embraced by governments at the beginning of the 
decade. They visualised an economically integrated Community with a single 
currency or, its equivalent, national currencies with immutably fixed 
parities. 
5. If they qave too little thought to the difficulties, it was because 
they were not yet obvious to countries which were used to the disciplines 
of Bretton w~ods. And in those days, Community inflation rates varied 
between a m"re two per cent and four per cent. 
6. In 1971, however, the whole context of the projected monetary union 
changed with the break-up of the old monetary order, after the suspension 
of dollar convertibility. 
7. From 1972, the Community was attempting to travel towards monetary 
union by way of the 'snake', which was intended to lead to irrevocably 
fixed parities by 1980. 
8. Faith in this process receded.as first Britain, and later Italy and 
France, ha0 ~o leave the 'snake' and float independently. 
9. The le~p in oil prices and the consequent cost inflation produced a 
world recession of pre-War severity. Inflation rates in the Community 
ranged from 7% in Germany to over 25% in Britain and Italy. 
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10. The studies of EMU made against this background by M. Marjolin and 
M. Tindemans were not encouraging. Indeed the latter suggested that the 
strong cur:-encies might go ahead alone. The two tier concept, as it c
1
ame 
to be know~, was not welcome. EMU was no longer a subject for practical 
men and wae left to academics. 
11. By 1977, it was obvious that there would have to be changes in the 
world financial system. The American dollar was becoming less and less 
adequate to pe£form its role as the main reserve currency. 
12. It was aiso obvious that the system of flexible exchange rates had not 
produced the promised miracles. Floating had not allowed Member States to 
expand witr,out fear for their balance of payments; and the problems of 
unemployment remained unsolved, against a background of formidable, even 
if diminishing, inflation. 
13. Yet a preditection for flexible rates remained. For in spite of the 
prevalence of high unemployment and inflation in the same economy, the 
belief persisted that--. tt:i.ere was a trade-off b~tween 1 unemployment and , 
inflation; and that ic ~as '. ehe 0·right of · a -·government to choose which of 
these it thought to be the lesser evil. 
14. It would follow, if this were so, that countries with different pre-
ferences could live together only if they had exchange rates which could 
adjust to diiferent and varying rates of inflation. 
15. At FlCJ.-ence, Mr Jenkins pleaded for the discarding of arguments against 
1 EMU based en such obsolete theory. "That is not how the world really is", 
he said, "and we all know it". Yet this is the plane on which the argument 
is still being conducted in political circles and must be met. 
16. Under EM~ with a common currency, what are regarded as among the most 
important functi0ns of modern government - control of the exchange rate and 
the money suppiy - would be exercised by central Community institutions. 
17. Some opponents of EMU fear that a national government, deprived of 
the·se functicns, would be running the risk of higher unemployment. 
18. A Britjsh economist has put the dilemma like this:- monetary arrange-
ments cannot insulate a government from eit~er the consequences of world 
events, or of its own policies. Yet 'powers to create money and alter 
parities allow governments to cushion those consequences and to some extent 
tb choose the form in which they will be felt'. 
1 In August 1978, the National Institute of Economic & Social Research 
recommended the British government to meet the expected recession of 1979 
by cutting taxes, letting the pound depreciate and maintaining a tight 
incomes policy to ensure that the depreciation is effective. Experience 
has shown that the effectiveness is temporary. Workers insist before 
long on c&tching up. 
I 
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19. Thus, ~ome freedom of manoeuvre would be reduced if governments lost 
those powers. 
20. There is also a fear that though the nation state under EMU would shed 
its balance of payments problems, an adverse balance could reappear in 
another form, largely in the unemployment figures. 
21. If, for example, wages rose faster and/or output rose slower in 
country A. than in the rest of the Community, this loss of competitivity 
would result in country A's consumers buying more goods from other parts 
of the Commu~ity, its firms making financial losses and so employing fewer 
people. It's government, too, might have to impose deflationary measures 
which would put people out of work. 
22. Governments, still clinging to a national power proved to be less 
effective than it was once thought to be. Yet they acknowledge that current 
problems are not capable of a national solution - not even for the strongest 
countries. 
23. The conviction that there are easy ways by which a government can 
increase deraar.d is fading away sometimes into economic defeatism. There 
is a new e~pnasis on restraining monetary and domestic credit expansion. 
24. Such p~udent measures may be the essential basis for expansion. But 
they are nut i~ themselves sufficient to stimulate expansion. 
0 
0 0 
25. Throughout his Florence lecture, Mr Jenkins refers only to MU, not to 
EMU. One suppo3es that this was done to keep the subject within bounds. 
Indeed, his lecture contained a number of economic implications. 
26. Econowi~ union, it must be assumed, goes far beyond the original 
economic ob~ectives of the EEC. 
27. It cove~s the Commission's current efforts to coordinate demand 
management and budgetary policies of Member States. But it also concerns 
the mammoth task of reforming the structures of national economies in order 
to reduce the disparities of their economic performance. 
28. Economic union specifically involves a considerable regional policy. 
0 
0 0 
29. Mr Jen~ins sees a future Community possessing its own major international 
currency system, a reserve currency, which would be a joint pillar of the 
world monetary system. He believes that the new case for EMU goes to the 
very heart of our problems of international financing, unemployment and 
inflation. 
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30. He sees a Community relieved by monetary union of its short-run 
balance of payments problems. Thus, its member nations would no longer b e 
constrained by such problems in their pursuit of economic expansion. 
31. Investors would have greater confidence that there would be a steady 
pursuit of expansion in Europe; that there would be lower inflation, and 
strengthened demand with a wider geographical bas e . 
32. He states emphatically that the weaker r egions will have to be 
insured againHt the aggravation of their difficulties by EMU. 
33. This requires to be spelled out. There would be serious difficulties 
in the regions if the structural differences between the member nations 
r e mained u r1changed. 
34. The current problem of regional disparities would be greatly sharpened 
if wage rates throughout Europe tended to move towards equality, while 
regional produ~tivity remained static. 
3 5 . Trade wo·1ld be attracted even more s trongly than it i s now t o t hose 
parts o f thP Commun i ty where prod uctivi ty is h iQ hos t ; c1 nd so wou l d capito1 l 
investment. 
36. These regional problems are with u s now, not only within but among the 
member cour,tries. Until the regional commi tment is rightly conceived and 
adequately backed, no scheme for monetary unity wi ll make sense, or command 
general support. There would have to be a redi stribution of wealth from 
the richer to the poorer nations. 
0 
0 0 
37. The President will disarm some critics b y his ex pressed belief that 
there is no need to develop the Community on a traditional federal scale . 
The Community, he says, should be given only those function s wh ich it can 
do better than the member nations can do. 
38. He accepts the calculation that definitiv e monetary union can be 
achieved on a budget of five to seven per cent of Community GNP. And 
great progress could be made on half that sum. 
39. It would be, however, a major constitutional step and so would have to 
command not merely the support of governments, but also of all the major 
political par ties of Europe. 
40. Most s : udies of MU seem to have been made by economists, bankers, and 
civil servaats. What is now necessary is a sympathetic ex amination in depth 
by politicians of all parties. There is no need for a call to action to be 
made to political opponents of EMU; they are already active. 
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41. Politicnl studies need to be made not only of how democratic political 
control cou~d be exercised over a central authority, but of the wider 
politic a 1 ~.mplica tions of EMU. 
42. For e£ample, what political freedom would it be possible for a me mber 
nation to ,..,xercise in the kind of developed Community now envisaged? llow 
far could it move towards Socialism? Or how far towards nee-liberalism? 
43. It may be suspected that it could go only a limited distance in either 
direction. For if the macro-economic decisions are made centrally, if they 
envisage fre~dom of capital movement and fiscal harmonisation, then strict 
limits are set to the political development of a nation state within the 
federal framework. 
44. The C~mmunity itself would, of course, be free to move in the direction 
which the ~ajority chose and the minority could tolerate. 
0 
0 0 
45. No time-scale was given by the President for the attainment of EMU. 
He believes ~hat the Union has to evolve, but reminds us that the evolu-
tionary process involves gradual progress, with occasional forward leaps. 
Europe should now prepare for the day when the great leap could be made. 
46. All a•1thorities seem to share Mr Jenkins' view that a pre-union stage 
is essenti~l. The five year programme presented by M. Ortoli for the 
Commission can be seen as such a stage. , 
47. The Bremen proposals now being studied and worked out in detail are a 
most import practical outcome of the programme. 
48. They propo~e an important step on the road t o EMU, b ut a nece s sary 
step: a European Monetary System which embraces strict exchange r e lation-
ships, a richly endowed pool of reserves, and the creation of a reserve 
currency based on the European unit of account which could develop over 
time into a ~ommon European money. 
49. These proposals have been described in such a jejune communique that 
it is impossible yet for anybody to pass judgment on them. They do, 
however, arouse hope that EMS will bring some of the benefits Mr Jenkins 
claims for full EMU. It would, of course, bring some of the problems too. 
50. The economic side of Bremen was presented even more sketchily than the 
monetary side. Nevertheless, the principle was agreed that ways would have 
to be found of strengthening the weaker economies and bringing inflation 
rates closer into line. The subsequent agreement, about national growth 
and anti-ir.flationary targets, achieved at Bonn a few weeks later by the 
seven major industrial nations, was also viewed with hope, but without con-
fidence of dubstantial economic accomplishment. 
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51. Finally, is there an alternative to EMU? There are several. We might 
go on as we are doing, and hope to muddle through. Or we might be content 
with the Eremen proposals for a European monetary system wh,ich could have 
some of the advantages which Mr Jenkins claims for full EMU. 
52. Or some member nations might prefer to go it alone, to pursue growth 
and full employment behind national tariff walls and quota systems. This 
could lead to the disruption of the Community, even to a world of national 
protectionism. 
53. What the ~olitical consequences would be, it is impossible to say. 
But those members who lived through the era of . nationalism in the thirties 
must have grave apprehensions. 
0 
0 
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EXPLANATION: RETROSPECT 
54. The European Council decided at Rome in March 1977 to assess at the 
end of the year the prospects of progress towards EMU. 
55. The Commission sent a .report on the subject (COM(77) 620) to the 
European Counqil in November in time for the promised assessment. In 
February this year, the Commission produced a follow-up document on an 
.action progra.mme for 1978 (COM(78) 52). 
56. Parliament has not been asked to study these documents, a remarkable 
and incomprehensible omission. 
57 • Parliam~nt was, however, able to hold a brief preliminnry dcba t c on 
EMU at the January plenary. It was open,ed by President Jenkins and Vice-
President Ortoli also spoke. 
58. Moreover, Mr MUller-Hermann and colleagues in the Christian-Democrat 
Group had taken the initiative to present to Pa.rliament a fully developed 
resolutio~ on the revival of EMU. 
59. Although the study of EMU is a perennial responsibility of the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, it is on this resolution that 
the committee is instructed to report. 
60. However, Mr MUller-Hermann' s resolui:ion and the more detailed 
Commission documents (which it will be convenient to describe as ''the 
Ortoli Prog=amme") run in parallel. The Ortoli programme is naturally 
more ope ra~ional in character. 
61. Your rapporteur hopes that you will think it useful that they should 
be studied alongside one another and jointly inspire the 
resolution which the Committee is s~mitt ing to Parli~ment. 
62. The picture of these EMU initiatives has been blurred by the supposed 
differences cf the Jenkins and the Ortol i approach. 
63. The diif2rence seems, however, largelyone of viewpoint. Mr Ortoli 
· looks from the point of departure at the path to be followed. Mr Jenkins 
views it from journeys end. 
64. Mr Ortoli prescribes how the obstac es must be overcome. Mr Jenkins 
points to the glittering prize at the end of the road - a monetary union 
sealed with a single currency. Such a system, he believes, would make it 
much easier to deal with the problems of growth, inflation and unemployment. 
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65. One co~mentator has said that Mr Jenkins has fired not a starters' 
pistol but a Verey light. 
0 
0 0 
66. The task for the next five years as seen by Mr MUller-Hermann and 
Mr Ortoli too is to persevere towards a Community of economic growth and 
monetary stability by following harmonised policies on both monetary and 
economic affairs. It means bravely setting out to conquer the inflationary 
recession and the unemployment it has created. These conditions have 
retarded, ~hough not totally impeded, the economic development of the 
Community over six despairing years. 
67. It muut, however, be recognised that the attempt today starts in a 
climate cf disillusionment and scepticism about the feasibility of complete 
EMU. And there are some who totally repudiate it as a goal. 
68. But both true believers and sceptics recognise that T~MU is not an 
immediately attainable goal or one that can yet be fixed at u point i.n 
time. Mr Jer.kins put this in his Florence lecture in memorable terms: 
There is room for tomorrow's 
act of better coordination 
and for today's discussion 
of a more ambitious plan 
for the day after tomorrow. 
The process has to be seen as one. 
69. There need, however, be no conflict yet between sceptics and 
believers. The road prescribed is that towards economic growth and 
monetary stability, a goal which surely must meet with the approval of a 11 
who want a mu=e effective Community, including those who do not want EMU. 
70. At sorr.e point of achievement, however, the Community must decide 
whether t0 go ahead to EMU or to be content with a lesser system or (· ·, c•r-v,1·: ) 
tion. 
71. That point where take-off is a possibility cannot be reached until 
the Community has rebuilt the self-confidence it had when it embarked on 
the Werner plan. 
0 
0 0 
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72. EMU is used in this report to mean an economic union built around a 
single currency, or its equivalent. All other schemes designed simply to 
achieve more stable currency relations will be described as EMS - a 
European monetary system. 
73. It is i~portant to maintain this distinction for EMU demands that 
Member States cede some national sovereignty. Schemes such as the 'snake', 
and other urrangements discussed before and at Bremen,may demand strict 
discipline and close cooperation. But there is no loss of sovereignty, 
for exits are provided for any country which may find that the arrangement 
imposes an intolerable strain. 
74. Your rapporteur believes that he should disclose his bias. He believes 
that complete EMU is desirable but is not feasible in the foreseeable 
future. He also believes that a scheme of monetary cooperation and 
economic convergence is essential if the Community is to foster prosperity 
and democraLic freedom, and to play a constructive role in the world trading 
and political community. 
75. The concept of EMU was not explicit in the Treaty of Rome but surely 
it was implicit if there was to be a common market with free movement of 
labour, capital, goods and services. 
_76. The rapporteur trusts that members of long experience will bear with 
him if he looks into the past. They remember well the hopes that Werner 
engendered and the cruel disappointment that so quickly followed. But 
some members of this Parliament and of this Committee too were not so 
close in tl::ose days to the European scene. 
77. In tre Sixties it looked as though the Community had found the golden 
key to economic growth and full employment at a rate of inflation modest 
enough to be tolerated. 
78. Not only Germany, but France and Italy too enjoyed economic miracles 
and seemed to be developing an ~onomic and even a political homogeneity. 
The road to F.uropean union looked straight and clear, though towards the 
end of the decade the storm clouds were gathering. 
79. In 1968 there were rumblings under the Bretton Woods system which had 
provided reasonable stability in the post-War years. 
80. It had two props: a strong US dollar acting as the major reserve and 
trading currency; and the will of participants to pursue responsible 
balance of payments policies. 
81. The Eurcpean Community at this stage was ready to enter the second 
long-term pha~e of its development. Membersbelievedthat the pursuit of 
monetary union would provide increased stability and make the final goal 
of political ,~nion possible. 
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82. The story of EMU begins at the European Summit of December 1969 with 
a decision to work out a stage by stage plan for EMU with the aid of the 
Commission: 
83. A few months later, the Council set up an expert committee under 
Mr Pierre Werner, the Luxembourg Prime Minister. 
84~ · Stage I of the Werner plan was to be achieved over 1971 - a coordina-
tion of short-term and budget policies. A start was to be made on tax har-
monisation, a mechanism for medium-term financial support, and an agree-
ment to restrict fluctuations among the currencies of Member States. 
85. The B.::-P.tton Woods system br.o}<e down in August 1971, when 
President Nixon decided that the gold-dollar link could no longer be sus-
tained in ,. world awash with dollars as a consequence of US inflationary 
spending O!l the Vietnam war. 
86. Even so, the desire for stability remained and was registered in the 
Smithsonian arrangement in the December. Parities were re-aligned and the 
permitted range of fluctuations widened. It had been 1% on either side of 
a par value in terms of gods (2% in all). It was now 2.25% on either side 
(4.5% in all). The system was abandoned for a system of floating in 1973. 
87. In Jan~ary 1972, the Community was enlarged by the accession of Britain, 
Ireland anJ Denmark. The Treaty was, however, not to take effect for another 
year. 
88. The first important step towards EMU was made three months later on 
22 Apri 1, 197 2 when member nations agreed to keep their rates within an 
agreed band of 2.25 per cent around the central cross rates. 
89. The 'snake' agreement, as it was called, e nvisaged lin~s of credit 
among the participants and rules for the settlement of the debts involved. 
90. Furth~rmore, members agreed to coordinate their economic policies and 
especially their monetary policies to t'te extent necessary to the smooth 
functionin0 of the arrangement . 
91. Britain blithely joined the 'snake' on 1 May - but only seven weeks 
later pressures on sterling caused her to drop out. Just after the turn 
of the year, the Italians had to leave. The French stayed in till the 
beginning of 1974. They went back in 1975 but out again in 1976. 
92. It was r.ot considered remarkable that Britain should enter the 'snake'. 
Even in 1967, Mr Callaghan was writing in 'Le Mende' that an enlarged 
Community (i.e. containing Britain) could establish its monetary power 
which might finally lead to a common European currency. In this currency, 
Member States' currencies, including sterling, would be joined. 
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93. The commitment to EMU of the British government and the governments 
of the ot~8r new members was made in October 1972 at the pre-entry Summit 
in Paris in unequivocal terms. "The Heads of State or of Government", the 
communique said, "reaffirm the determination of the Member States of the 
enlarged Communities irreversibly to achieve the economic and monetary 
union, confirming all the elements of t he i nstrumen ts a dopte d by the 
Council, and by the representatives o f the Member S t ates on 22 March l '>71 
and 21 March 1972". 
94. But though the Community accomplished its e nlargement it failed in 
its "approfondissement". Stage II (1972-1975) o f t he Werner plan was to 
witness t he joint preparations of economic polic i es , harmonisation of VAT 
and excise duties; currency fluctuations cut to l per cent and the Special 
Drawing Rights from the IMF to be managed joi nt ly . 
95. Stage III (1976-1978) was to see an EEC Centra l Banking System and 
Reserve Fund, free capital movement and the removal o f tax frontiers. By 
1980, currency paritie s we re to b e f ixe d and made i mmov a b le . 
96. Of course, it ne ver happened. The world monetary crisis blew th e 
'snake' out oi its tunnel to become the instrument of a concerted float 
against tm, floating dollar. A.11 that rema i ns o f the 'snake' is the Deutsche-
mark linked to the currencies of some smaller countries. 
97. The other main European currencies - sterling, the franc, the lira -
are all floating independently. Many people see the 'snake', however, as 
the mechanism of the future. It is in preparation for an eventually 
broadened 'snake' that the Bremen proposals have been put forward. 
98. It is essential that the Community should n ow learn from the · errors 
and frustrat i ons of the past. 
99. Three Y:! ars a go the Mar j olin report" said : "Enrope is no nearer t o F.MU 
than in 1969 •.. national economic and monetary policies have never been more 
discordant, more divergent than they are today. 
l.OQ. "Each national policy is seeking to solve problems and to overcome 
difficulties which arise in each individual country, without reference to 
Europe as an entity. . The coordination of national policies is a pious wish 
which is hardly ever achieved in practice". 
101. Marjolin ascribes the failure partly to unfavourable events (the inter-
national mon~tary crisis and the sharp rise in oil proces in 1973) both un-
foreseen an~ unforeseeable when the decision to create EMU was taken. 
H The Tindemans report, the following year, did not stimulate movement towards 
EMU. Mr Tindemans consulted the Member Governments and recommended acc~p-
tance of the division between countries with stronger and w~a~er ~~rr~ncies. 
His ideas did not find favour because there
1
was a general d1s1ncl1nat1on to 
accept a "two-tier" Community. 
- 19 - PE 52.839/fin. 
~D.2. THE OTHER CAUSES OF FAILURE WERE LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND OF UNDER-
STANDING WHAT EMU REALLY MEANT. "AT GOVERNM~T LEVEL THERE WAS NO ANALYSIS 
• • • OF THE CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED". 
1.0;3. "It was just as if the governments had undertaken the enterprise in the 
naive belief that it was sufficient to decree the formation of an EMU for 
this to come about at the end of a few years, without great effort or diffi-
cult and pair ful economic and political transformations". 
104. THE CUSTOMS UNION MERELY REQUIRED GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE UP THErUSE OF 
CUSTOMS DUTIES AND QUOTAS AS INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICIES. EMU DEMANDS 
THAT THE INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY SHOULD BE PUT AT THE DIS-
POSAL OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS. 
105,. In other w0rds, that macro-economic monetary and exchange policies should 
be no longer in the hands of national governments or the subject of merely 
national debRte in national parliaments. 
106 · 1· says fr•nkly that the common institutions would have to inc lude: • Ma:ipo in .. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
A European political power; 
I 
A community Budget 'of some weight; 
An integrated system of central banks. 
These institutions "WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO FUNCTION IN A COMPARABLE WAY TO 
THOSE OF A FEDERAi. STATE". 
107. He does not believe that European unity will come in small steps. He is 
very near the ~oncept of the "great leap". He speculates on the need for "a 
radical and almost instant transformation, coming about after long discussions 
but giving rise at a precise point in time to European institutions". 
106. But he is nearer Ortoli when he says that members together in cooperation 
with N. America and Japan must face the problems of inflation, massive payment 
deficits, unemployment "without asking too many questions about the future". 
109. "For, if in the presence of these great dangers a minimum of unity and 
cohesion cannot be created, it does not seem very useful to pursue the dis-
cussion of EMU." 
ll;Q. If, on t:1e other hand, a common will emerges on urgent concrete problems, 
Europe will raach a situation in which the grand designs are once again con-
ceivable. 
111. Since M. Marjolin wrote, some, though not enough, progress has been made 
in the conquest of inflation and towards coordinated economic policies. And 
the dialogue witn the US and Japan continues. 
0 
0 0 
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THE ROAD TO BREMEN 
112. As both Mliller-Hermann and Ortoli are concerned with the pre-union 
phase and with a remedy for our present discontents, and as they are taking 
similar though not identical routes, they can profitably be studied together . 
113. Both of t~em agree that EMU is not an immediate possibility. Mliller-
Hermann regards a return to fixed exchange rates as a distant prospect. 
114. Ortoli implies the same thing when he says that the necessary transfer 
of significant f_unctions from the nation-states to the Community cannot be 
achieved in ~he near future. It is, however, essential for Member States to 
prepare the way to that goal. 
115. On convergence, Mliller-Hermann says that the Council's proposals on 
this subject made in 1974 and 1977 should be implemented. The stronger 
countries shoul1 nelp to reduce the inequalities in the Community. And th e 
recipients of aid should make good use of it by dealing with their inflation 
and their ex~ernal deficits. 
116. Ortoli expresses similar ideas when he says that convergence implies 
countering i!.flation and achieving greater stability in external balances 
and exchange rates. 
117. Both believe that it is essential to boost demand and pave the way 
for a return to sustained growth to improve employment. 
118. Ortoli points out that convergence requires neither identical national 
policies nor equRl performances. 
119. The f i.rsi: step, says Ortoli, towards fuller control of demand is to 
coordinate s;1crt-term economic policies. 
120. Both are agreed on the need to develop an industrial and commercial 
structural p0licy and to shun the temptations to withdraw into protectionism. 
121. There is a difference in emphasis on current policy. Ortoli calls 
attention to the posi~ive influence of the Commission on iron and steel and 
the need for Community intervention in shipbuilding and textiles. 
122. Mliller-H€rmann says cautiously that in view of. the crises in these 
industries th~ ~ommunity needs to define its position in the world. It must 
not retreat into a defensive sectoral policy. 
123. Both ure concerned about industries of the future. Mliller-Hermann is 
thinking in terms of research and development, Ortoli sees the Community 
having a role as an economic power in industries based on advanced technology. 
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124. The sections on energy presented by both are rather thin. Muller-
Hermann deman~s a coordinated policy on the development of new resources and 
on the more economic use of resources to be worked out by 1982. 
125. Ortol: is concerned to ensure adequate investment, a policy for 
nuclear and other energy sources and "a true common market for energy". 
126. On e~ployment, Mliller-Hermann demands social compensation to cope with 
the strains on the social consensus which can be caused by any form of self-
discipline in any country. This statement requires some amplification. 
127. The Cor,1mission will propos e a minimum threshold of social protection, 
joint outline provision on workers' rights, security of employment and worker 
participatio:-i. 
128. Mullet-Hermann underlines the need for more participation in management 
decisions an~ fer better training. 
129. All the foregoing must be regarded as the necessary economic action to 
support a policy of monetary cooperation. 
130. Mliller-Hermann says that a common policy on currency is 0sscntiul and 
he regards the 'snake' as the future corner-stone of monetary union. 
131. Both the Commission and the Member States outside the 'snake' should 
be brought into discussions with a view to closer alignment (the Bremen pro-
posals have ~vertaken this demand). 
132. Ortolj proposed that the first objective must be to integra te all cur-
rencies withln a single Community mechanism adapted to the capacities of each 
economy. 
133. The rules of this mechanism should impel non-'snake' countries to con-
duct their exchange rate policies compatibly and in accord with their agreed 
economic polici~s. 
134. There must be support for the countries with the greatest economic 
difficulties. 
135. The Muller-Hermann proposals are in the same mood. They suggest t!J=>t 
further consideration should be given to the Duisenberg proposals for target 
currency zones and a set of rules for floating (see Chapter IV). 
136. There should be stricter supervision of money supply policies and 
eventually binding arrangements to prevent the inflationary financing of 
budgets. He calls too for new impetus to be given to the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund. 
137. Ortoli said the Commission was to study the uses of a parallel currency 
(see Chapter I\') and proposed the extended use of the unit of account. 
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138. 
139. 
All these proposals enter into the Bremen brief. 
On the regional problem, the Mliller-Hermann resolution asks for 
increases in the Regional and Social Funds. But the resolution does not 
establish the vital link between the reduction of regional disparities and 
progress to\\ards EMU. Ortoli says that the Community could reduce intern<tl 
imbalances r.y action on r e gional and other policies. 
140. Though the requirements will be well below those of a federal state, 
no progress towards EMU can be made without transferring larger reserves to 
the Community. 
141. Both look for progress towards the single market. Mliller-Hermann goes 
further than Ortoli in wanting a common company law and competition law. 
142. Ortoli believes that important differences would remain in commercial, 
social and tax legislation. 
143. Both agree on the need for tax harmonisation, especially on VAT 
(excise duti~s too, the Commission adds}. Measures to abolish fiscal 
frontier s shou ld be decided at the e nd of the pjve Year Programme . 
0 
0 0 
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THE BREMEN OUTLINE 
144. The pioposals made at Bremen were of great importance. They were to 
study ways c :c stabilising currencies in Europe by creating a system of strict 
exchange relations, the establishment of a well endowe d pool oE reserves and 
the creation of a reserve currency based on the European unit of account. 
145. The Council stated that it regarded the creation of a zone of monetary 
stability as a highly desirable objective. It instructed the finance ministers 
to draw the guid~lines of such a scheme for the competent Community bodies to 
elaborate by 31 October. 
146. Studies would be undertaken of the action needed to strengthen the 
economies of the less prosperous members in the context of such a scheme. 
147. The council seem to have faced the fact that if the errors of the 
original 'snake' are not to be repeated, if in fact the weaker members on 
this occasion are going to be able to stay in the system, politically 
acceptable waya will have to be found of bringing inflation rates into c los er 
convergence as ~ell as of strengthening the weaker economies. 
148. The 'snake' countries stated that the 'snake' itself was not going to 
become laxer. And an annex to the communique said that exchange rate 
management u~der the new system should be as strict as that of the 'snake', 
although cou1.tries outside the 'snake' might opt for a time for somewhat 
wider margins around the central rates. 
149. In principle (whatever that may mean) interventions would be in the 
currencies of participating countries and changes in the central rate would 
be subject to mutual consent. 
150. The Ecu would be at the centre of the system and would be us ed as a 
means of s e ttlement b e twee n 1mc monetary authorities. 
151. The i 11 itial supply of Ecu's (for use among Community central banks) 
would be credted against the deposit of US dollars and gold (amounting to 
20% of the stocks currently held) and of a matching quantity of the currencies 
of Member States. 
152. Two years after the start of the scheme, the existing arrangements and 
institutions shou~d be consolidated into a European Monetary Fund. 
153. The support for the scheme seems to have been universal but less than 
wholehearted. Not enough has yet been revealed and not enough has been decided 
for judgment t:> be passed. The economic side of the summit was buried under 
the monetary proposals. 
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154. In the end, a lot may turn on the concurrent studies that were put in 
train of the action needed to strengthen the economies of the less prosperous 
countries aP.d µresumably the Mediterranean applicants for membership. 
155. Some members reflect the belief, expressed by Mr Milller-Hermann and 
Mr Ortoli, t~at progress towards economic union must be made alongside pro-
gress towards monetary union. 
156. There is no doubt that real advantages would flow from the achievement 
and sustenance of a zone of monetary stability. When currencies are as 
unstable as they are, it is hard for investors to act with confidence. 
157. It must, however, be recognised that the instability of European cur-
rencies derives from the differential policies of member countries. If cur-
rencies are to be less unstable, it means that economic policies will have 
to be less ~~ssimilar. 
158. The coordination of monetary and economic politics called for by the 
Commission will be essential if the zone of stability is to be achieved. 
159. This raises the question of whether the political will for such coordina-
tion really exists. If it does not, if the not very long step to EMS cannot 
be taken, then the idea of an eventual leap to EMU had better be forgotten. 
160. Politi~al will can be as easily sapped by despair about the pos-
sibilities of the reflationary approach to growth as by a reluctance 
rigorously t~ curb inflation. 
161. Polictes of fiscal conservatism and strict financial discipline must 
be recognised as carrying as many risks as the opposite policies. If they 
induced recession and left industry with the onus of re-structuring, the 
demand for protection might well prove irresistible. 
0 
0 0 
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CHAPTER II 
==n;· ;:-;; TT ,-- -a== 
ANALYSIS OF MR JENKINS' LECTURE 
FULL MONETARY UNION 
16.2. Mr JENKIN3' major contribution to the subject of EMU was made in his 
Jean MONNET ler.ture at Florence in October 1977. This was amplified in his 
two speeches at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on 17 January 
1978. 
163. Mr JENKINS' object at Florence was to re-awaken interest in the concept 
of Monetary Union which he found 'immobilised in scepticism' following the 
demise of the Werner plan. 
164. Mr JENKINS' contribution has all the merits of a good lecture. It is 
elegant and pers~asive, a calculated enticement to debate. It is not an 
exhaustive treiltise. 
He ts trying to revive faith in the concept of EMU in an age very dif-
ferent from the one in which it first appeared. And he argues, in a bold 
paradox, that the very ills that killed it - inflation and monetary disorder 
make its revival essential. 
165. Mr JENKINS chooses to refer only to Monetary Union, not to Economic and 
Monetary Union . Monetary Union embraces Economic Union, though Economic Union 
itself may not require Monetary Union . 
166. And becao..1E"e he is engaged on a reviv.alist mission he has much more to 
say about the prospective benefits of MU than about its apparent cost in 
national pride and sovereignty. The sceptics can be trusted to restore the 
balance of the argument~ 
167. The President is not one of those old True Believers who lament a 
Community that, they fear, is in decline and decay. 
168. The Community, he reminds us, has three major functions and there is 
activity and Fromise in two of them. It stands for a certain type of democratic 
and political society (as the Mediterranean applications bear witness). And 
it stands for a political entity to deal with a wide range of external relations. 
169. Its third function is to provide a central economic mechanism and it is 
here that the weaknesses are conspicuous. 
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170. Mr JENKIN, fears that if these central weaknesses continue, the external 
cohesion of ~~e Community may not be kept. Faced with the strains of enlarge-
ment, the Cmrmunity must either strengthen its sinews or halt its progress 
so that it never becomes anything greater than a loose customs union. 
171. He insists that Europe cannot back into MU by acts of mere co-ordination. 
MU can evolve; but evolution goes both gradually and in jumps. Europe, he 
suggests, should prepare for the day when the eventual leap has to be taken. 
This is by no means a n idiosyncratic view of the President. It is held by a 
number who have seriously thought about the problem of achieving full MU. 
172. He demanda that we now take a fresh look at MU and face the new arguments, 
needs and approaches. 
THEY GO TO THE VERY HEART OF OUR CURRENT PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 
INFLATION, AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCING. 
0 
0 0 
THE SEVEN ARGUMENTS 
173. Mr JENKINS adduces seven arguments in favour of MU. Before deploying 
them, he point~ out that basic to his case is the ineluctable internationalism 
of Western economic life. Even the best national economic policies have their 
limitations. 
This is accentuated by the oil crisis. It confirmed that the old inter-
national monetary order had come to an end; and it provided a new hazard for 
the vulnerable Eur~pean economy, an international liquidity, massive, badly 
distributed, a~d largely uncontrolled. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
174. MU favours more efficient rationalisation of industry and commerce than 
could be achieved under a mere customs union. 
175. MU reduces, as between Member States, exchange rate risks and the un-
certainties of inflation. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
176. We should create a major new international currency. It would be a joint 
alternative pi~lar of the world monetary system. 
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177. The Community would thus be relieved of short run balance of payments 
problems. It could restore a poor trading position by dropping its currency 
a few points. 
178. The econ0mic expansion of member-nations today is checked by balance of 
payments problems. With MU such constraints would be largely removed. 
179. BUT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE UNIVERSAL DISCIPLINES ACHIEVED BY WHAT 
MR JENKINS DELICATELY CALLS 'RE-LOCATING THE LEVEL OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC POLICY 
POWERS'. 
180. As Mr JENKINS told Parliament MU would involve 'a significant transfer 
of power from member governments to the Community'. This transfer would be 
'limited but significant Two of what are generally regarded as the more 
important functions of a modern government - control over the exchange rate 
and control o-,er the money supply - would be exercised by central Community 
institutions instead of by governments'. 
181. With MU Europe would be able to combat world monetary disorder by re-
designing a large part of the world monetary system. Europe has the political 
framework to do this and the Community is the right size and type of unit. 
18.2. At the inter-continental level there is probably no alternati. ve to float-
ing rates; not a bad system when the units are widely separated geographically 
and in other wa-{s. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
183. MU would lead to a common rate of price movement throughout the Community. 
And so it could establish a new era of price stability. 
184. Of course the sources of the present inflation are diverse and include 
struggles over i~come distribution. 
185. Imagine that a European Monetary Authority issues a single new currency. 
186. The Aut:1ority controls the note issue and Bank money creation. It sets 
target rates ~f monetary expansion in the best European tradition. National 
governments wc,uld lose control over some aspects of macro-economic policy. 
187. MU, though a radical treatment for inflation, is not a complete cure. 
We should still have competing claims on limited resources. 
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J,_88, Wages ncros s national frontiers must, of course, retain a reasonable 
relationship to productivity. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
189. No medium term recipe for reducing inflation is acceptable if it 
does not benefi~ employment . 
190. Unempl~yment is a problem of deficiency of demand. MU would lessen 
the constrai1,ts on our ability to cause a smooth and sustained increase of 
demand. 
191. Though structural and monetary problems make it difficult to reduce un-
employment, they do not justify defeatist policies to reduce permanently 
Europe's economic potential (say, by a big cut in working hours or very early 
retirement). 
192. Present unemployment is not just a long and very low bottom to the 
cycle. We n~ed a new impul se on an historic sca le. THE NEEDS OF THE THIRD 
WORLD HAVE A MAJOR PART TO PLAY HERE. 
- 2.9 _ PE 52 .839/fin. 
193. In the past, two sources of growth have sometimes come together; one 
regional, the other world-wide. 
194. To turn the ·tide of employment prospects we need:-
(a) Confidence that expansionist policies can be steadily pursued. 
(b) Str3ngthened demand with a wide geographical base. 
(c) Low~r and more even inflation. 
(d) To make sure that local difficulties do not develop into general 
crises of confidence. 
195. But how do we get rid of the institutional weaknesses that have prevented 
us from applying ~hese remedies? 
196. The deterioration in the inflation - unemployment relationship has b e en 
well tracked b/ economists. So we must discard arguments based on ol>so l C!L<' 
theory:-
(a) That the objections to European integration are the differing 
preferences of Member States between inflation and unemployment. 
(b) That floating exchange rates allow each country to solve its pro-
blems on its own and in its preferred way. 
197. 'This is ,1ow how the world really is' comments Mr JENKINS. 
know it'. (All_]) 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
'And we all 
198. This is about the regional distribution of employment and economic wel-
fare. 
199. Today the C~mmunity bears no resemblance to the laisser-faire caricature 
of its critics. All Member States, for example, spend large sums of public 
money to get a more even distribution of jobs and national wealth. 
20G. In the Ccmmunity, there is a financial battery firing on the right 
targets. But it is a battery of small guns - The Regional and Social Funds, 
the European Investment Bank, The Agricultural Guidance Fund and the Iron and 
Steel Community financial powers. 
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20:. If Eurn~e's aim is MU, then the weak regions must be insured against the 
aggravation r.y the system of their economic difficulties. 
202. This insurance provides an advantage . for the stronger regions. For it 
secures a more stable and prosperous market. 
203. We must t.ake a realistic view about the convergence of economic perfor-
mance. Regional differences in living standards cannot be dealt with drasti-
cally. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
204. MU implies a major new authority to manage the exchange rate:-
It would manage the external reserves. It would manage the main lines 
of the internal monetary policy of the Community. 
205. Can MU be reconciled with the desire for less centralised government? 
'Yes' Mr JENKINS answers 'but monetary policy can be decentralised only to a 
very limited eAtent' . 
206. Public expenditure is a different case. It now equals half of GNP -
and this req~ires multi-tiered government of which the Federal model is only 
one of several possibilities. Europe must be built on the basis of our late 
twentieth century nation states. 
We must give to the Community only those functions which will deliver 
better results. 
207. In most Menwer States welfare expenditure equals twenty-five per cent 
of GNP. So thera is no need to develop Community expenditure on a traditional 
federal scale. What makes sense for Europe is to take central decisions whare:-
I.ntercon-tinental bargaining power is required. 
Research and development offer economies of scale. 
Industrial policies which require economies of scale such 
as electronics and aerospace. 
Industrial policies required to deal with excess capacity -
Steel, Textiles, Ship-building, etc. 
Strategic interests (e.g. energy). 
FinanciaJ policies to support the maintenance of 
regional balance . 
208. Mr JENKINS quotes Sir Donald McDOUGALL's report. The Community's present 
expenditure is 1% ·GNP. Substantial progress towards MU could be made with two 
to two and a half per cent GNP. Definitive MU is feasible at a level of five 
to seven per cent GNP. 
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209. These a1e large sums and they would have to be built up by the transfer 
of expenditure from national budgets. Classical federations, however, often 
' take twenty to twenty-five per cent GNP. 
210. Yet the political implication would be great putting monetary policy on 
a European level would be as big a political step as was taken when the Com-
munity was originally set up. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
211. The cre2tion of MU would take Europe over a political threshold and 
would require a leap to do so. The President believes we must give our people 
an aim beyond the immediately possible, following M. MONNET's dictum that 
politics is the art of making possible tomorrow what may seem impossible today. 
0 
0 0 
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CIIAPTER t II 
1. ANALYSIS OF THE MULLER-HERMANN RESOLUTION AND THE ORTOLI PROGRAMME 
MULLER-HERMP.NN RESOLUTION - INTRODUCTION 
The MUller-Hermann resolution welcomes the Ortoli programme to revive 
EMU and rur-. s parallel to it. 
This resolution is optimistic. It rejects the widespread apathy and 
current r~signation. It expresses the belief that the Community's dif-
ficulties - inflation, unemployment, economic stagnation and external 
deficits can be overcome. 
"At the same time positive progress - if only in stages - towards EMU 
can be achieved by means of careful and forward-looking coordination of 
Community meci.sures; not by a plethora of separate independent actions". 
The MUller-Hermann resolution says plainly: "A return to fixed 
exchange .c2 tes is no more than a distant prospect". 
It w~lcomes the statement made at the summit of industrialised nations 
in May: "Cur most urgent task is to create more jobs while continuing to 
reduce inflation". 
Enough freedom for market forces must be provided, says MUller-Hermann, 
if the climate is to favour economic growth. 
And the investment needed to check unemployment requires confidence, 
hig,her yielde on capital and high consumption. 
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THE ORTOL1 PROGRAMME - INTRODUCTION 
The document begins with a recognition that since 1972 EMU has .bee n 
stagnating and the intermediate ob jectives have not been achieved. 
The crisis which followed the rise in oil prices has accentuated the 
differences within the Community. Between 1974 and 1977 inflation has 
ranged from 25% to more than 100 per cent. Unemployment now stands at 
six million. 
The crisis has taught that the machinery of cooperation has to be set 
up before ~he difficulties arise. 
To d8al with the new situation, Member States have followed their own 
policies. They have under-estimated both their own independence and the 
scope of joint action. 
'rhe crisis provides additional reason [or achievi ng pro<Jrc•!l!-1 toward~ 
EMU. Member States are highly interdependent. Each member country sends 
more than half its exports to its partners in the Community. 
The Cooc~unity could be weakened by the addition of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain unless progress towards EMU had been made in the meantime. 
Two 2.pproaches to EMU were envisaged in .the past. The first was 
gradually to improve the coordination of economic policies and iron out 
structural and regional imbalances. The second was to transfer significant 
economic and monetary functions fro~ the nation states to the Community. 
The first approach towards economic coordination must have a clear 
ultimate goal. The second objective cannot be achieved in the immedi<1tc' 
future. 
The Cc~mission now propose action to make simultaneous progress 
towards both goals in the immediate future. Member States must prove 
their determination by taking practical measures to prepare the way for 
eventual full union. 
The Commission proposes a Five Year Action Programme. Each year the 
details of the programme for the next 12 months would be spelled out. 
At the end of each year, the European Council would assess the results 
and consider the Action Plan for the next year. 
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(MUller-Hermann Resolution} 
CONVERGENCE 
The Mliller-Hermann resolution aims to reduce inequality in the 
Community. Those countries with strong currencies and economic potential 
must provide resources; and those countries receiving aid should make good 
use of it by dealing with their inflation and their external deficits. 
(The coordination of national budgetary policy is crucial to the process 
of integration, especially on the size of deficits and their financing). 
It argues that enough freedom for market forces must be provided if the 
climate is to favour economic growth. 
The investment needed to check unemployment requires confidence, 
higher yields on capital and high consumption. 
Thus demand should be boosted and national reflationary measures 
should be taken though they would vary from country to country. 
In vi~w of the divergent cost and price trends in Member States, it 
will be pos3ible only in the long-term to define a common economic policy 
for all Me.nber States. 
However, the Council's statement in 1974 on the need for the conver-
gence of policies should be implemented. 
And so should the Commission proposal of October 1977 on improved 
coordination of policies. A standard forecasting system would help this. 
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(The Ortuli Programme) 
CONVERGENCE 
The first aim is to get lasting convergence among the economies of 
Member States. This implies (1) countering inflation, (2) achieving 
greater stability in external balances and exchange rates and (3) a 
return to sustained growth to improve employment. 
The ob;ective of convergence does not imply that national policies 
must be id~ntical or that performances must be equal. 
It G0es imply that Member States should agree on priorities. First 
priority should be given to countering inflation. 
Coordinating short-term economic policies is a step towards fuller 
control of demand. This effort must be based on extending the present 
machinery of coordination in budgetary, monetary and exchange rate areas. 
Each Member State should observe the objectives set. 
PE S2.8J9/Un. 
(MUller-Hermann Resolution) 
INDUSTRY 
Small businesses, which adjust most easily to changes in demand, 
require incentives and technical know-how. 
Industries for the future require particular Community efforts in 
development and research. 
Provision for these needs should be made by the budgets of both the 
Community anc Member States. 
Neither Member States nor the Community must withdraw into protection-
ism, for w.2 ourselves are heavily dependent on exports; and because of our 
enormous ~conomic potential we bear heavy responsibility for the develop-
ment of the world economy. 
Thus the Community external policy must be amplified and the GATT 
supported. 
But th<.) opportunities Gl\T'r provides against dumpin(j ,rnd di.scrirni.11,1tion 
must be fully used . 
In vie"' of the crisis in steel, textiles and shipbuilding, and the 
increasing competition from the Third World countries, the Community needs 
to define its position in the world. Yet it must not retreat into a 
defensive sectoral policy. 
A Community industrial and commercial structural policy must be 
developed both to encourage the growth industries and help the economic 
sectors whi~b. are in danger. 
ENERGY 
By 1J82 there should be a coordinated policy on the development of 
new energy resources and the more economic use of energy. 
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(The Ortoli ?~ogramme) 
INDUSTRY 
The s~ructural changes in industry needed to maintain competitive nes s 
will have to be made in a climate less favourable to growth a nd increased 
employment:. 
The Community can help to work out a strategy of sectoral change 
based on an analysis of the industries as they are and as they may fore-
seeably develop. 
This involves ensuring a better exchange of information among Member 
States; checking that developments are in line with macro-economic targets; 
forestalllng the difficulties in a given sector of changes in demand. 
One ~ommission duty is to prevent purely defensive reactions in Member 
States dectling with the industries worst hit by the crisis. 
A good example of the Commission's positive influence is its a c t ion 
in the iron and steel sector. Shipbuilding a nd textilP-s a l ~o ca ll f o i: 
Community intervention. 
In both the industrial and services sectors, there are"growth 
industries". In the medium-term the expansion of energy, telecommunications, 
data processing, electronics and aircraft, will support economic growth and 
employment. 
The Community must equip itself to assume its role as an economic 
power in industries based on advanced technology which need the resources 
and the markets of a whole continent. The Commission will report on the 
problem in July. 
ENERGY 
An energy policy for Europe is essential to ensure that there is 
adequate investment in energy projects. 
It i3 necessary to lay down guidelines on energy saving; to develop a 
policy for nuclear and other sources of energy: to establish a true common 
market for. energy; to participate in the world dialogue. 
This programme will improve employment since it will speed up the 
return to growth and facilitate strµctural change. It must be backed up by 
a social policy providing support for Member States' efforts to create 
employment in the industries with a future potential. 
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(MUller-hermann ~esolution) 
EMPLOYMEN'r 
Social compensation is needed t o co pe wi th s trains -on th n i-i ocLd . con-
s ensus which can be caused by a n y f orm o f se lf-discipline in any c ountry. 
WorkeLs' and i ndustrial organi s a t ions, Parliament and governments must 
al l promote s~abi l ity a n d s afeg uard j obs. 
There must be broader part i c ipation i n asset formation; better train-
ing of workers; mor e participation by worke rs in management decisions. 
WorkJ .ng condit ions must be further humanised and social security 
extended . 
CURRENCIES 
A common policy on currency is essentia l. The ' s nake ' is the f ut u r e 
corner stone of monetary union . A re turn to a fi x ed c xc h<1n q c r a t e i s 11 0 
more than a distant prospect yet the return to f i xed rate i s s till a 
Community task . 
Both the Commission and Member States outside the 'snake' should be 
brought i~to its discussions with a view to closer alignment. 
The Community should draw up r ule s f or forei g n e x change policy which 
each Member could eventually approve . 
Further consideration should be give n to the Duisenberg proposals on 
t arge t zones and rules for f l oa t ing.* 
The recent increase in medium- term curre ncy s upport i s we lcome d, but 
loan conditions should be controlled more s t ringently. 
There must be stricter supervis i on of the mone y s upply policies of 
Member Stat es: eventually there must be bind i ng arrangements to prevent 
the inflationary financing of bud get s. 
Money suppl y should be allowed to e x pand with the potential increase 
i n produc tion and the unavoidable rate o f inflation. 
Finally, there is a call for a new impetus to be given to the 
European Mo~etary Cooperation Fund. When Member States are dealing with 
the f l uc t ua t i on of exchange r a t es i n their countries, EMCF should be the 
coord ina tor . 
H See Chapte r III 
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EMPLOYMENT 
The Community must develop a joint strategy for improving wage a nd 
salary rat:: os. The Conunission will propose a minimum threshold of social 
protection; joint outline provision on workers rights; security of employ-
ment; worker participation. 
CURRENCIES 
There must be greater cohesion among European currencies. The 'snake' 
is ready ~o take back those currencies which had to leave it. 
But the first objective must be to integrate all currencies within a 
single Community mechanism adapted to the capacities of each economy. 
The rules of conduct of this mechanism should impel the non-'snake' 
countries to conduct their exchange rate policies compatibly and in accord 
with their agreed economic policies.* 
There must be support for the countries .with the greatest difficulties 
and dissu,sionfrom falling back on independent remedies. 
The Commission is to study the uses of a parallel currency.* It might 
be useful to extend use of the European Unit of Account to international 
capit~ l markets and to some long-term international contracts; 
The resources of the EMCP should be increased so that it might con-
tribute to the management of exchange markets. 
There should be an increase over the next few years of financial 
resources avllable to the Community for use in areas where it might get 
better reavlts than the Member States would get. 
The Commission will make proposals to promote the freedom of capital 
movement in parallel to measures for achieving economic convergence. 
One of the major objectives is the gradual elimination of MCAs. 
The last barriers to full exercise of the right of establishment 
should be removed over the next five years. 
H See Chapt~r III 
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(Mliller-Hermann Resolution) 
POLICIES IN OTHER FIELDS 
The Regio:is 
The trend to regional disparities can be halted only by speeding up 
regional development. Both the Regional Fund and the Social Fund should 
be increased and the Social Fund used more often in a regional context. 
The EIB should mobilise more funds for regional development and an 
institution should be set up alongside to help SMUs. 
Single M::,.rket 
To remove the last obstacles to a uniform common internal market, 
new efforts should be made to reach certain goals by 1982. 
The se goals include:- common company law; common competition law to 
counter the trend towards concentration; far-reaching harmonisation of 
taxation i~cluding VAT; coordinated policy on more economic use of energy 
and the d~velopment of new energy resources. 
Harmonis".ng Taxation 
By 1982, there should be a far-reaching harmonisation of taxa-
tion, especially value added tax. 
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(The Ortoli Programme) 
POLICIES IN OTHER FIELDS 
The Regions 
The Community could reduce internal imbalances by action on regional, 
social, industrial and energy policies. 
The requirements to reduce these imbalances will remain well below 
those of a federal state. No progress can however be made towards EMU 
without transferring larger reserves to the Community. This should not 
raise public expenditure in the member countries. 
Single Market 
The Community look for progress in establishing a single market. The 
common market would not however become wholly comparable to the national 
markets. lmportant differences would remain in commercial, social and tax 
legislation. 
The unity of the market would prevail over national law and practices 
which would otherwise distort price relationships. 
Harmonising Taxation 
A speci~l effort will have to be made in tax harmonisation - particu-
larly VAT and excise duties. 
At the end of the five year programme the Community should decide on 
measures ~o abolish fiscal frontiers. 
A co~mon market for such services as insurance and banking should be 
established. 
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(Mllller-Hermann Resolution) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Mliller-Hermann package is a useful, practical and fairly conven-
tional set of remedies to deal with the present ills. 1-bst of the remedies 
are alreacli• agreed, although some of them are not being adequately carried 
out. 
Faced with current difficulties, the Community must have coordinated 
economic, budgetary and nx,netary policies. The inequalities anx,ng Member 
States and aIOC>ng regions must be tackled by the stronger helping the weaker 
and the weaker helping themselves. There must be a Community scheme to 
rebuild thre~tened industries and encourage new structural/industrial 
policy. The Community must not go in for sectoral protection but should do 
what GATT allows to be done to cope with dumping and discrimination. As 
for currencies, the Member States outside the 'snake' should discuss with 
'snake' members in the hope of reaching closer alignment. There should be 
a Community code on exchange policy and the Duisenberg proposals for cur-
rency target zones should be studied again. 
The M.Uller-Hermann resolutibn contains much that will win general 
acceptance. I~ does not, however, overtly recognise the need for govern-
mental investment. 
The resolution also suggests there is need for agreement on the per-
centage of national . income and revenue for the social security system which 
should go to the national authorities. 
Your rapporteur is puzzled by this and thinks it far-fetched to get 
agreement en such a matter. He sees no reason why such agreement should 
be thought necessary or desirable in the near future. 
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(The Ortcli Programme) 
CO NCL US IONS 
Here again, most of the programme will be generally acceptable even 
to those who will not go all the way to EMU. ·rhe programme is, of course, 
an evolution of the economic policies that were already being pragmat i cally 
followed. Now they are put in the context of the Commission's final goal 
of EMU. There is however a new emphasis on the need for monetary stability 
and an attempt to bring the 'snake' back into the centre of the picture. 
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2. ACTION FOR 1978 
The Commission has already presented an action programme for 1978, the 
first year of the five year programme. 
The Commission proposes: 
CONVERGENCE 
1. Progr3ss made towards agreed economic targets must be monitored 
between ministerial sessions. This requires the coordination committee 
to be strengthened and its role made clearer. 
2. Stre~gthening the coordination of short-term economic policies. 
The Council should refine its coordination procedures and put them into 
action. This applies especially to national monetary policies. 
3. The return to monetary cohesion. 
(a) The strengthening of the 'snake'; further study of exchange 
rate changes; joint measures to restore a coherent pattern of 
exc·:iange rate relationships. 
(b) Tile conditions for financial support; the proposals to revise 
short-term support quotas; monitoring the conditions on economic 
policies imposed when the Community gives financial support. 
THE SINGLE MARKET 
1. Free movement of goods and services. 
(a) Customs Union 
Decisions to be taken on the rules for cooperation between 
n~tional customs' authorities and between them and the Commission; 
~irective on procedures for the release of goods for free circu-
i ation; proposal for simplifying the Community transit scheme; 
p~oposal for easing the formalities involved in intra-Community 
trade in goods subject to VAT but to no other tax. 
(b) Removal of technical barriers to trade 
Directives already proposed on industrial products and foods 
should be adopted. 
(c) fgmmon market for services 
J'he Council should decide on proposals already before it concern-
ing stock exchanges, insurance and assurance. 
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(d) Public contracts 
A directive on these comes into force on 1 July 1978. 
(e) Liberalisation of capital movements 
To be encouraged. 
(f) Removal of monetary compensatory amounts in agriculture 
~~e first step should be taken in accordance with the Commission's 
proposal when farm prices are fixed for 1978 and 1979. 
2. Harmonisation. 
(a) Tax Harmonisation 
Preparatory work on harmonisation of VAT rates; decisions to be 
tRken on proposals already before the Council on excise duties, 
direct taxation, tax evasion and duty-free allowances. 
(b) Company Law 
11he Council should adopt the third (mergers), fourth (annual 
accounts) and sixth (prospectuses) directives. 
(c) Merger Control 
The Council should adopt the 1973 proposal. 
STRUCTURAL POLICIES 
1. Industrial change. 
(a) Industrial Intervention 
To continue in steel, textiles and clothing and shipbuilding 
sectors. 
(b) Growth Sectors 
Efforts to identify and develop these sectors. 
(c) Comrtunity Instruments 
St~tistical studies to be carried out. 
2. Energy Policy. 
(a) Ene=gy Independence 
Proposals already made on energy savings and the development of 
energy sources in the Community should be adopted. 
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(b) CollUtlOn Energy Market 
Proposals for encouraging the use of coal in power stations 
should be adopted; new conununication to be made on oil refining 
policy . 
(c) Financial Instruments 
Lending operations under Euratom to be increased; a new financial 
instrument to be used to increase the incentive to invest in the 
energy sector. 
3. Agricultural Structural Development 
Proposals have been made to promote the structural development of farms 
and to stress that the structural policy must make greater allowance for 
regional disparities. 
4. Regj.u11al Policy 
The Council should act rapidly on proposals already made for coord.i.nati n<J 
national regional policies, strengthening the role of the Regional Policy 
Committee, assessing the regional impact of other regional policies and 
improving the operations of the European Regional Development Fund. 
5. Investment Policy 
(a) Lwestment aid policy 
Commission to evaluate the analysis of general investment 
;_ncentives. 
(b) Investment in non- member countries 
Council should discuss a proposal made about the promotion or 
investments in developing countries and the guarantees needed 
to protect them. 
(c) Public investment 
'!'he Conunission will draw up an outline of the kind of investment 
in infra-structure the Community needs. 
SOCIAL POLICY 
1. Employment Policy 
(a) §!!!2loyment of Young People 
A proposal to provide aid for the creation of jobs for young 
peop"!..e. 
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(b) Labour Market 
The Commission to seek to expand cooperation among Member States 
in developing national institutions designed to improve the 
~alance between the supply and demand of trained workers. 
(c) Economic and Social Problems Linked to Employment 
A systematic approach to be worked out. 
2. Incomes and Working Conditions 
Council should take decisions on proposals already before it. Other pro-
posals to ~e made by the Commission include: 
(a) Income Scales 
Reinforcement of action to reduce inequalities. 
(b) Improved Working Conditions 
Health and safety at work and work-sharing. 
3. Social Protection and Social Security 
Commission to pursue its efforts to lay down corruoon minimum social pro-
tection rules to cover the major risks. 
4. Work~r Participation 
Commission to continue its efforts to organise conferences bringing 
together t .he two side~ of industry and the Commission. Proposal t o be 
made on the obligation of groups of undertakings to inform and consult 
staff or their representatives. 
0 
0 0 
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CH.l\PTER IV 
TARGET ZONES 
The case for creating a system of Target Currency Zones rests on two 
supposit ions . It would be a way of getting minimum monetary stability in 
the Community and would require and inspire better coordination of economic 
policies. And it would possibly be a cautious step towards EMU. 
Such a l'!lOVe is reported to have been broached at the European Council 
meeting at Copenhagen in April; and t o be due for further consideration 
when the European Council meets at Bremen in June, as a prelude to the 
summit of seven leading world economies at Bonn in July. 
Five problems which are damaging the world economy have been identified: 
Low growth 
Currency instability 
The trend to protectionism 
Over-dependence on imported energy 
Inadequate flows of stable long-term capital aid 
from surplus countries to deficit countries 
(including many in the developing world). 
The hopes of two years ago that the industrialised world was coming 
out of the recession which followed the increase in oil prices have been 
disappointed. Progress there is; but it is sluggish. 
At the same time disillusionment with floating has grown. The belief 
that floating would allow expansionary policies to be followed without 
strain on the balance of payments has been sadly discarded. 
And dis~llusionment has grown with what economic progress might be 
achieved ~y independent national governments. l\s Mr Denis Healey, British 
Chancello::- of the Exchequer, said in his budget speech on 11 April: "l[ 
we are to solve this country's problems we need to take action on a world 
scale because no single country can lead the world out of its difficulties. 
Indeed, no single country can by itself solve even its own problems". 
Within the Community it is all too evident that the current economic 
divergence and the monetary instability are politically and economically 
damaging and r,ossibly even dangerous. 
The nonetary crises of recent years and the failure to achieve suf-
ficiently coordinated economic policies have shaken confidene in the 
future, discouraged investment and inspired fears that the hardest hit 
countries might not be able to maintain their liberal obligations under 
the Treaty. 
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The temptation is to advocate a dash for discipline, a repentant 
return by the defaulting nations to the 'snake', with its obligation on 
members to keep their exchange rate 'th' b s wi in a and of 2.25 per cent. 
But the 'snake' failed in its basic obJ'ect to ensure stable relation-
ships among the four big European currencies.· th e Deutschemark, the Franc, 
the Lira and Sterling. 
It fo.iled because rates of {nfl t · · 
• a ion varied from member country to 
member country and countries did not or could not adjust their domestic 
economic policies. 
Pressures developed on exchange rate relationships. 
forced to leave the 'snake' within weeks as the pressure 
mounted. The Lira and Franc eventually found t~e going 
Britain was 
on Sterling 
too hard for them. 
It is, your rapporteur believes, unlikely that the Member States out-
side the 'snake' could yet contemplate returning to such strict restraints. 
There is little likelihood that the necessary convergence of inflation 
rates, productivity rates and cyclical developments can be achieved in 
the near future. 
There are two possibilities: one is of broadening considerably the 
2.25 per cen.t band and loosening the discipline. It has even been sug-
gested that Member States in difficulties could be allowed to float 
temporarily outside the 'snake'. These proposals do not look acceptable 
to the present members. 
The other favoured possibility is that a looser general arrangement 
might be maje to which the 'snake' might be a party while retaining its 
habitual i~ternal discipline. 
The rewa~d of aecopting this obligation would be help for each country 
from the other member countries in carrying out policies to keep it 
within the zone. 
This idea appears to have been born out of the rules for managed 
floating proposed by the IMF, of which Mr Duisenberg was once an official. 
Of cou~se the system provides for changes in the target zone after 
consultations with the other member nations and agreement that change is 
desirable. 
The time is surely ripe to re-examine the proposal for Target :zones 
put up to the Council of Ministers by Mr Duisenberg, the Netherlands 
Minister of Finance, in July 1976. 
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The proposed system was for each member country to be set a target 
zone defin i ng the upper and lower limit for its exchange rates. 
Each country would refrain from POLICIES and INTERVENTIONS that 
would cause the exchange rate to rise or fall out of the target zone. 
The virtue of the scheme is that it is evolutionary and could start 
by insisting that member countries accept only minimum constraints. 
The nuisenberg proposals were buried at the finance ministers' Council 
in Brussels in March 1977. The inflation rates were too wide apart. But 
they have come closer and the system may now be feasible. 
PARALLEL CURRENCY 
There ~s a less conventional scheme designed to lead towards 
monetary i~tegration - a proposal for a parallel currency. 
The ~entral idea is the creation of a new currency under the control 
of a comm.:)n institution, issued by a new official bank. 
There are a number of variants of the proposals. Sometimes the new 
currency is called the Europa and it is a convenient name. 
The Europa, it is suggested, would circulate alongside national cur-
rencies. At first it should be used only for official transactions. Its 
use shoulct be gradually extended and eventually it would become the sole 
currency o~ Europe replacing all national currencies. 
The oroposal becomes highly technical the moment the broad concept is 
left behind. It is one of those subjects for which the Committee requires 
the evidence of experts - enthusiasts and sceptics. 
One of the suggestions is that nominal exchange rates of Conununity 
currencies should be evolved in terms of the Europa itself. And the 
Europa coulc be defined as the EUA - the basket European unit of account. 
It is also proposed that the Europa should have the role of a primary 
reserve asset. Member countries would be credited with Europas at the 
European lbnetary Cooperation Fund against the deposit of gold at market 
prices. 
Thus it would develop as a counterpart of the SDR and gradually become 
both a reserve and intervention asset. 
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-The~ ~he Europa could be used in private credit markets. As long as 
it was a ~ere parallel currency, its use by a resident would be regulated 
by his co• ..mtry. 
The position of non-residents should be under the surveillance of the 
EMCF. 
Existing financial institutions of the Community should of course use 
the Europa and the EIB could play a key role. 
0 
0 0 
The rapporteur acknowledges his debt to articles by Dr T. Magnifico, 
chief adviser to the Banca d'Italia Rome; and c. J. Oort the 
Treasurer General, Netherlands Ministry of Finance. 
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ANNEX I 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 496/77) 
tabled by Mr MULLER-HERMANN, Mr KLEPSCH, 
Mr NOTENBOOM, Mr RIPAMONTI and Mr DESCHAMPS 
on benalf of the Christian-Democratic Group 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the revival of economic and monetary union 
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, . I Preamble 
The proposal to establish an economic and monetary union made at the 
summit in the Hague in 1969 constitutes the most significant initiative in 
the process of community integration. This objective must continue to be 
the focal point of the work of the Community's institutions. 
The European Parliament has not missed a single opportunity of 
supporting efforts to achieve integration in economic and monetary fields. 
In particular, it has endorsed the Council's resolutions on the progressive 
realization of this union, as envisaged in the Werner Plan. It notes, to 
its regret, however, that despite the various proposals subsequently 
submitted by the Commission and despite the Tindemans report, insufficient 
progress has been made towards economic and monetary union. The same 
observation applies to the two Tripartite Conferences and the Fourth Progranune 
on Medium-Term Economic Policy, which contains a large number of proposals, 
is associated only with the stage of realization. 
The Community is at present contemplating further enlargement, a project 
which the European Parliament has endor•ed on many occasions. It realizes that 
new responsibilities and considerable burdens will arise as a result of this 
enlargement, not only for the Community as a whole but for each individual 
Member state. In view of already existing Community problems and the specific 
problems of Member states the European Parliament feels that more progress 
should be made towards integration before any new Member States actually join 
the Community. The European Parliament therefore calls upon all the Community 
institutions to show a stronger sense of purpose by taking practical steps 
here and now to promote the achievement of European Union and in particular 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
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The European Parliament is alarmed to observe that 
the Community's 
economic difficulties, which 
are partly indicative of a t 
s ate of cr i sis, 
are making the joint shaping of policies increasingly harder a nd 
encouraging countries to go their own way and d t .. 
. . a op protectionis t measures 
This is contrary to the spirit and letter f th . · 
o e Rome Treaties. The 
European Parliament fully endorses the · principles of a 
division of labour and a 11· b 1 t d 
era ra e policy based on 
better international 
arrangements. fair reciprocal ' 
It also urges that the Community make every possible effort 
in order to face the worldwide crises and to revive the economic grow th 
in the worle to provide specially the third world with adequate opportunities 
of development, in particular by ensuring that its markets remain a ccessible 
to products from third world countries. The European Parliament re a l izes 
tl,:,t t!,e pursuit of ~u<'li i. non-protectionist policy by the Community would 
make the restructurin?. o f its economy to adjust to future requirements .i 111.itter 
of the highest priority. 
Special efforts in the field of monetary politics are necessary regarding the 
common agricultural policy and in view of the special responsability of the 
Community with its strong economic potential for the monetary order in the 
world. 
In view of this twofold challenge the Community must recover its sense 
of unity an~ pursue a courageous and realistic policy . The European 
Parliament therefore welcomes the commiasion's attempt in its 'Communication 
on the prospects for economic and monetary union' to the European council 
of 5 and 6 October 1977 to revive economic and monetary union. It shares 
the commission's view that the process of integration needs to be 
consolidated and vigorously continued. 
The European Parliament therefore makes the following proposals in this 
resolution which relate to parallel action in the fields of economic and 
monetary policy. It hopes that the joint efforts of the community's 
institutions will be crowned with more success in the future than in the 
past. 
II 
Towards a more positive policy for growth without inflation in the 
European Community 
1. The declaration issued by the Heads of i:;tate and Government following 
their meeting in London on 11 May 1977 contains the fol lowi ng 
statement: 'Our most urgent task is to create more jobs while 
continuing to reduce inflation. Inflation does not reduce unemployment. 
On the contrary, it is one of its major causes.' In making this 
declaration the Community has set itself a clear joint objective. 
At the same time the content of the joint declaration provides 
justification for the assumption that common experiences will now 
lead to the drawing of common conclusions. 
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2. The European Parliament therefore calls on the Commission and the 
governments of the Member States to continue to combat inflation and 
to endeavour to maintain existing jobs and create new ones. 
J. community solidarity, so often invoked in the past, is faced with yet 
another tost. ·rho oxcoasive imbalances within the Community must be 
purposefully eliminated if progress is to be made towards economic and 
monetary union. The European Parliament believes that this can be 
achieved only if the countries with fixed currencies and strong 
economic potential agree to aid measures and the transfer of resources 
and the countries with high rates of inflation and balance of payments 
deficits ensure, by making the necessary effort themselves, that this 
aid leads to their difficulties being overcome. 
4. The European Parliament 
Bel.ieves that only a policy which gives enough freedom to market 
for,·,,• wl J I p'rovide the dynami em neceaaary to create il climate 
oon<.Jucivo to rnnewt1d f!conomlc gr.owtl1; 
- Sees a need for general policy measures of a regulative nature to 
enable industry, workers and consumers to plan for the future; 
- Points out that the recovery of investment necessary to check 
unemployment presupposes the re-establishment of a climate of 
confidence, a return to higher yields on capital and increased. 
consumption; 
- Urges that efforts should be made to stabilize the production costs 
of undertakings and to boost productivity; 
- Recommends that demand should be purposively boosted but feels that 
all measures to reflate the economy, which may vary in scope and 
nature from one state to another, should be ta~en in a concerted 
glol;>al conc,pt; 
Recommends that specific incentives should be given to the tertiar-
sector and to small business, - specially by bringing technical 
know-hows to their disposition - w~ich adjust easily to 
variations in demand, and by reason of its numerous independent forms 
in the Community, ensures variety and at the same time offers the 
individual an , opportunity of personal fulfilment; 
- Feels that particular efforts should be made in developm~nt and 
research in industries of the future and to supply the necessary 
Community funds; 
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- calls on the Council and Commission to make allowance for these 
requirements in framing the budgetary policy of the Community and 
that of the Member States, i.e. substantially to increase capital 
expenditure, especially in the economically weak regions, to 
increasing expenditure on develdpment and research, to reduce the 
pressure of costs on industry by increasing investment capacity 
and profitability and by abandoning all measures which act as a 
disincentive to personal achiev&ment. 
5 . The great strains placed on the social consensus by any form of self-
discipline in any country are realistic only if they are accompanied 
by appropriate social compen,sation. Parliaments, and governments, 
workers and industrialists ana their organizations must all be 
persuaded by 
- broader participation in ,a:s,se.t f~,mati.on 
- better training enabling workers to become more mobile 
- the participation of workers in management decisions 
- the humanization of working conditions and 
- the extension and consolidation of social security syetems 
to take part in joint action to promote stability and safeguard jobs. 
All parties must realize that the reduction in the rate of inflation 
constitutes an effective means of increasing real incomes. Furthermore, 
governments of the Member States mu'st make a contribution to the 
stabilization of costs by pursuing suitable fiscal policies. 
6 . The European Parliament feels it would be harmful if the Member States 
and the Community, which is itself heavily dependent on exports and, in 
view of its enormous economic potential, bears a large share of 
responsibility for development of the world economy, were to withdraw 
into a policy of protectionism. 
I~ the opinion of the European Parliament 
- _the common external trade policy must be maintained and amplified: 
it is essential that the common external trade policy should, in 
accordance with the principle of reciprocity, bind all Member States 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to uphold the principle 
of free access to markets and consequently to respect the role of 
competition as the main factor inducing greater prosperity . This 
impliea the need for a non-protectionist trading policy towards both 
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developing countries and countries with other economic systems 
provided that comparable non-restrictive conditions are guaranteed 
by all parties concerned. The Community should use every opportunity 
provided within GATT to defend itself against dumping and 
discriminatory practices; 
- it is of the utmost urgency , on account of the structural changes, 
which are evidenced for example in the current crisis in the 
community's steel industry, textile industry and shipbuilding industry, 
that the community defi ne its position in the world, especially in 
the light of increasing competition from third world countries, and 
not retreat into a defensive sectoral policy; 
- a comprehensive forward-looking industrial and commercial structural 
policy must be developed in order to facilitate the adjustment to 
future needs - which usually implies an increase in productivity - of 
economic sectors in dange~ and to encourage growth industries; 
expects the Commission, in the light of international fluctuations in 
demand and in the terms of competition, to produce an analysis of 
future prospects together with relevant conclusions. 
III 
Towards a more positive policy to promote the integration of economic and 
monetary policies and the elimination of regional imbalances in the community 
7. The European Parliament, aware that in vlew of the divergent cost and 
price trends in the Member States it will be possible only in the long 
term to define a common economic policy for all Member States, calls on 
the Commission to implement the Council's decision of 18 February 1974 
on the 'attainment of a high degree of convergence of the economic 
policies of the Member States of the European Economic Community' and 
the proposals from the commission of 5 October 1977 (COM(77) 443 final) 
for the improved coordination of the economic policies of Member States 
of the European Community. 
Therefore, for the guidance of all those involved in the economic 
process a coordinated Community definition of the objectives and 
general terms of national economic policies is indispensable. A useful 
foundation for this could be laid by introducing a standard forecasting 
system over a period of five years in each of the Community countries • . 
The European Parliament welcomes the Commission's idea, expressed in 
its documont of 17 November 1977 (COM (77) 620 final), of carrying out 
an annual check on results and possibly maki'ng adjustments, within the 
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framework of a five-year action programme, in order to e~sure that 
community policy is brought into line with the necessary structural 
changes and that its objectives continue to be realistic. 
All remaining obstacles to the creation of a uniform common internal 
market with complete freedom of movement for goods, services and capital 
should be eliminated. The European Parliament therefore calls for new 
efforts to achieve, by 1982, 
- common company law 
- common competition law to counteract an undesirable trend towards 
concentration and making mergers involving firms exceeding a given 
size subject to an approval procedure 
- a far-reaching harmonization of taxation, especially Value Added Taz 
and 
- a coordinated policy on the development of new energy resources and 
the more economic use of energy. 
8. The European Parliament regrets that marked regional disparities still 
exist within the Community. 
The European Parliament, 
- Points out tha t this trend can only be, halted by an effective regional 
policy conceived as a means of speeding up the development of 
particular regions and compatible with the industrial and commercial 
policy called for above: 
- Recommends that in granting resources from the Social Fund greater 
account should be taken of regional policy considerations than 
hitherto especially to stimulate the entreprises in settling instructural ly 
weak regions with a high rate of unemployment; 
- urges, therefore, that appropriations for the Regional and Social Funds 
should be increased and the activity of the European Investment Bank 
stepped up since this can specifically guarantee that the altogether 
welcome process of capital transfer will be effective: 
- Considers it desi rable for the European Investment Bank to mobilize 
more funds, through the recycling of capital, for regional development 
projects: 
- Proposes that an institution should be set up - preferably alongside 
the European Investment Bank - to assist small and medium-sized 
undertakings by providing them vith capital. 
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9. The European Parliament believes that the financial and budgetary 
policy of the Member States con•titutea a crucial factor in the 
process of integration. 
The European Parliament 
- Advocates, therefore, the coordination of the Member States' 
budgetary policies, especially as regards the size of their deficits 
and their financing; 
- sees a need for agreement to be reached on the percentage of national 
income and revenue from the social security system which should go to 
the public authorities; 
- calls on the council to ensure that jointly-established budgetary 
guidelines are attached to the draft budgets submitted to national 
parliaments; 
IV 
Towards a more positive monetary cooperation policy 
10. A common monetary policy is essential if the lasting integra~ion of the 
economic policies of the Member States is to be achieved. 
The European Parliament takes the view that every time the governments 
of the Member States succeed in curbing inflation they are helping to 
avoid disturbances in the international monetary system and at the same 
time create favourable conditions for the realization of a common 
monetary policy enabling a lasting alignment of monetary parities. 
The European Parliament 
- Regards the continued existence of the currency snake, as the future 
cornerstone of monetary union, as absolutely essential; 
Is of course aware that a return to fixed exchange rates is no more 
than a distant prospect. The return to fixed exchange rates within 
the community,however, is still a Conununity task which must not be 
neglected, especially in connection with the problem of farm prices; 
- considers it desirable for those Me~r atates outside the snake 
and the Commis~ion t~ be brought into the -di1cu11ion1 held by those 
ineide the 1nake with a view to cloeer ;alignment at a subsequent stage; 
- Recommends that the Community should draw up a list of rules and 
obligations in the matter of foreign exchange policy which each of 
the Member States should eventually approve: 
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- Advocates further consideration of the Duisenberg proposals, 
which are baaed on the concept of rules governing floating and 
target zones for exchange rates: 
- urges that exchange rate policy should be regarded as a matter 
of common interest (Art, lo7 !FC) and that it ak••ld be the subject 
of . regular di1cu1sion - especially before any modification of exchange rates. 
t 3 • The European Parliament welcomes the docision taken at the last 
meeting of the Council of Finance Ministers to increase medium-term 
currency support and to extend the ConlfflUnity's power to negotiate 
loans. It urges that financial aid ehould be granted only on 
condition that the Member State adheres both tv Jointly-established 
general economic and monetary objectives and to specific instructions 
and that compliance with conditiona ie controlled more stringently 
in order thus to ensure greater convergence of economic policies. 
11, 'l'he 1•:llropoan ParUament is convinced that effective cooperation in 
mon~tary policy presupposes stricter auporvision of Member States' 
money supply policies. Common principles and guidelines on money 
creation must gradually be defined and eventually made binding in 
order, principally, to prevent the inflationary financing of Member 
States' budgets. 
The money supply should be allowed to expand at a rate reasonably 
consistent with the increase in production potential and with the 
unavoidable rate of inflation. 
12·, The European Parliament 
- Calls for a new impetus for the European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund: 
_ States the principle that the monetary fund with Board of Directors 
must function independent ly but in the scope o( the general economic 
policy; 
- Urges that the monetary fund, which is administered by the governors 
of the central banks - acting independently in the context of general 
economic policy - establish priorities at Community level for 
monetary and credit policy, though harmonization need not initially 
be taken as far as complete standardization: 
- Believes that this monetary fund should also be responsible for the 
clearing and coordination of intervention in the event of fluctua-
tions of currencies of third countries: 
- Urges the implementation of the Commission's proposals of 12 
December 1974 which recommend the central coordination of Member 
States' monetary policies within the framework of the monetary fund. 
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V Conclusions 
14. The European Parliament's proposals are guided by the belief that 
the Community's difficulties - inflation, unemployment, stagnant 
growth and balance of payments deficits - can be overcome and at 
the same time positive progress - if only in stages - towards 
economic and monetary union can be achieved only by means of 
careful and forward-looking coordination of Community measures and 
not by a plethora of separate and independent actions. 
15. The European Parliament sees no reason for the resignation and 
apathy which have become so widespread. However, the citizens of 
the Community, and in particular its young people, would be entitled 
to feel disappointed if the responsible Community institutions -
especially before the forthcoming direct election of the European 
Parliament - were to slacken their efforts to put the necessary 
measures into effect. The European Parliament recommends the Council 
and Commission to supplement their political efforts with a special 
action programme designed to make the Community's citizens even 
more aware than hitherto of their increasing geographical mobility 
and showing how national frontiers have been overcome in everyday 
life. 
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ANNEX II 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 209/78) 
tabled by Mr ANSQUER, Mr de la MALENE, Mr BOUQUEREL, 
Mr BROSNAN, Mr BRUGHA, Mr COINTAT, Mr HERBERT, Mr INCHAUSPE, 
Mr KASPEREIT, Mr KRIEG, Mr LIOGIER, Mr NOLAN, Mr POWER, 
Mr RIVIEREZ and Mr YEATS 
on behalf of the Group of European Progressive Democrats 
with request. for urgent debate 
pursuant to Rul~ 14 of the Rules of Procedure 
on economic and monetary union 
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The European Parliament, 
1. Hopes that an overal l and parallel approach will be a dopl e d l o all 
problems concerned wi th e conomic and monet .:i ry 1111 i.on: 
2. Peels '.:hat the essent i al ne ed to br i ng econom i c struc tures closer 
together can be met only by restoring financial equilibrium and 
implementing an ambitious regional policy; 
3. Calls for the strengthening of the common policies and the rationalization 
of European budgetary options; 
4. Considers it vital to establish a consensus on a rigorous monetary and 
financ i al policy, industrial policy guidelines, external discipline and 
a joint political will for a constructive dialogue with the social 
partners: 
5. Considers that pr i ority must be g i ven to combat i ng unemployment, 
particularly among young people; 
6. Approves the gradual introduction of a European Settlements area, 
creating~ haven of monetary stability; 
7. Favours the joint management of Community resources through the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund; 
8. Urges that Community resources be mobilized more effectively by 
extending medium-term financial support and strengthening short-term 
monetary support; 
9. Hopes that the i nternational monetary system wi ll be re f ormed i11 
concert with the United States so as to put an end i n particular to 
the preser.t monetary free-for-all and the excessive issue of special 
drawing rights ; 
10. Recommends that Europe should participate in the setting up of a new 
world m.Jnetary system, combining flexibility with rigidity and based on 
a stable monetary standard reflecting the scale of international 
economic transactions; 
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission. 
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ANNEX III 
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL POLICY, REGIONAL 
PLANNING AND TRANSPORT 
Draftsman: Mr A. DAMSEAUX 
On 19 May 1978 the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning 
and Transport appointed Mr DAMSEAUX draftsman of its opinion. 
It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 24 May 1978 and 
adopted it unanimously. 
Present: Lord Bruce of Donington, chairman; Mr Nyberg, Mr McDonald 
and Mr Durand, vice-chairman; Mr Damseaux, draftsman; Mr Brosnan, 
Mr Delmott~ , Mr Fitch, Mr Hoffman, Mr Jung, Mr Noe, P~ Schyns, Mr Seefeld 
and Mr Starke 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. The pro~ess initiated at the Hague Summit in 1969 for the achieve ment 
of economic and monetary union, of which t he Council resolution of 22 March 
19711 on the a t tainment by stages of economic union in the Comrnunity marked 
the starti11g point, has been stagnating since 1972. 
However, the Paris Summit in October 1 972 reasserted the will 'to 
strengthen the Community by establishing an economic and monetary union', 
2. The monetary crisis further complicated by the oil crisis has bee n a k e y 
factor in slowing down this process. 
The Me:nber States have been forced to pursue ' their own independent 
policies, i.:.nderestimating both the extent of their interdependence and the 
possible sr.ope of joint action• 2 
However, in its communication on the prospects for econo mi c a nd mor.e t:ary 
union, the Commission states that 'in its d e velopment a nd t hr o u g h i ts 
attainment, the historic act of economic and monetary union could mako a 
decisive contribution towards achie"ing the comrnon goal of stability and 
3 growth' 
3. The sectrch for solutions to monetary and external problems should not 
make us for~et the internal criterion for economic and monetary union, i.e. 
the progressive elimination of the most important structural and regional 
imbalances in the Community. 
4. According to the Council resolution of 22 March 1971, once economic and 
monetary union has been achieved, the Community: 
l 
2 
1. Will constitute a zone in which persons, goods, services and 
capita: can circulate freely without distortions of competition 
and without giving rise to structural or regional imbalances, 
and under conditions that wi l l enable all those engaged in 
econo~ic activity to function anywhere in the Community; 
2. Will form a dist1nct monetary entity in the international 
system, with fully and permanently convertible curre ncies, 
the abolition of margins of fluctuation for e xchange rates, 
and the introduction of permanently fixed parity rates - all 
of which are essential for the creation of a single currency -
and a Community central bank organization; 
OJ No. C 28, 27.3.1971. 
Comrnission: 'Communication on the prospect of economic and monetary 
union', Br~ssels, 17.11.1977, COM(77) 620 final, end of Chapter I(b) . 
3 Same Communication, end of Chapte ~ I(c). 
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5. 
3. Will nave the economic and monetary powers and responsibility 
to ena~le its institutions to administer the union. To this 
end, the required economic policy decisions will be taken at 
ConiP1unity level and the necessary powers vested in the 
ins d tutions of the Community. 
An adequate basic equilibrium must be established betweon tile 
economies of the countries forming the economic and monetary union to 
provide these three essential elements of the union. But this 
equilibrium does not exist at present; the structural differences 
between t he Mernl::.er States' economies are too great and give rise to 
v arying degrees of structural and regional imbalance in the Member States. 
Despite Member States' intervention policies, the difference in average 
per capita qross domestic product between the rich and poor regions of 
the Communi ty became still greater in the period 1970 - 1975 . 
6. It sho~ld be recalled that the Council of Ministers stated that 'Whereas 
an effective policy on regional structures is an essential prerequisite to 
the reali.zali.on of economic and monetary union', the Fund in i.nr.ended ' ... t.o 
contribute to the correction of the main regional imbalances within lh!'"! 
Community which are likely to prejudice the attainment of economic and 
monetary union' (Regulation establishing a European Development Fund, 
1 
Article 6 (1)). -
7. An attE-1,tpt must therefore be made to determine the relations 
between the a~tainment of the various objectives of economic and monetary 
union and the elimination of the main structural and regional imbalances 
in the Community. We must also try to define the scale o f the 
financial resources required in the Community to put an end to such 
regional imbalances. 
A. Regional imbalances and the objectives of economic and 
monetary union 
8. Accordi.119 to the Council resolution of 22 March 1971, the objectives 
of economic and monetary union are twofold: 
- a monetary objective: 
fully convertible currencies and permanently fixed exchange rates; 
- economic objectives: 
• satisfactory growth, full employment, internal stability, 
reducLion of structural and regional imbalances and e xternal 
. . . 2 
equi l 1. ::,r 1. um 
An internal study by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy in 
the Commission of the European Communities dated 19 October 1971, on 
3 
regional policy and economic and monetary union, although old, is of 
major methodological interest. 
l Regulation (~~C) No.724 175 of the Council of 18 March 1975 establishing a 
European Regional Development Fund, OJ No.L73,21.3.1975, pp. 1 and 3. 
2 Beginning of Chapter I of the resolution of 22 March 1971 
3 Document XVI/137 /71-F 
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we shall now consider, on the one hand, regional imbalances and the 
monetary objective and, on the other, regional imbalances and the economic 
objectives. 
a) Re9ional_imbalances_and_the_monetary_objective 
9. The analysis given in the above study shows tha~ the varying degrees 
of regional imbalance in the Member States affect their inflationary 
tendencies in different ways. 
The value of their respective currencies thus tends to evolve unevenly. 
There is a glaring contradiction between the existing situation, with 
different regional imbalances from one Member State to anotrnr and the 
monetary objective pursued by the union. 
The analysis shows that the factors of inflation, whether apparent or 
insidious, co~e to light: 
- in the zones of concentration, mainly in costs; 
- in t~e less-developed regions, mainly in demand. 
(1) Zones of concentration 
10. In the zones of concentration the factors of inflation are linked to the 
production factor price and the cost of infrastructures. 
In periods of high demand, the production factor price tends to 
increase in zones of concentration where the most productive industries 
are generally located. 
Increases in the production factor price tend - to spread to 
activities in the same branch or to sectors without the same productivity 
growth potential and may have direct inflationary repercussions on prices 
or indirect repercussions in the form of consumption of own capital. 
The effect also spreads to other regions because of the effect of 
intra-sectoral relations in terms of costs and prices and also in wages 
and salaries, w~ich tend to become standardized. 
11, Inflat~0nary trends in the zones of concentration are however 
automatically corrected when production factors move in from 
less-developed regions, so that there is an increase in production 
capacity and services available if the immigrant workers have the 
necessary qualifications. 
However, this immigration aggravates the problem of social infrastructure 
costs to the extent that infrastructures are already fully stretched in 
the areas of over-concentration. Further social investments may be 
needed becau~e of inflation. 
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12. Inflation through the cost of infrastructures results from the fact 
that above a ce~ tain threshold, the marginal cost of social infrastructures 
exceeds the ma=gi na l be nefits they provide. 
In libera l economies, industrial undertakings and services tend to 
expand in rHgions t hat already have a certain level of economic concentration, 
enabling them to effect e xternal savings. 
Up to a certain level, this concentration of activity enables the public 
authorities to achieve ~conomies of scale in infrastructures for which they 
are financiall~ responsible (transport, schools, hospitals etc). However, 
at some point, Lecause of over-concentration, the marginal social cost of 
infrastructvre~ may exceed the marginal social benefits. Economies of 
scale no lo11g9r exist for the public authorities but there are external 
savings for the undertakings. Undertakings benefit only at the expense of 
the public authorities. If private undertakings were responsible for 
infrastructures, they would be unable to expand above a certain level of 
concentration. 
To enable t he zone s of concent ration to continue to develop economically, 
the public authorities carry out important infrastructural work whose 
social cost exceeds the social benefits. The price of land and civil 
engineering works (tunnels, viaducts etc.) constantly increases, 
necessitati~g loans at very high interest rates. The financing of such 
infrastructu~es (depreciation and interest) has an inflationary effect. 
13. Zones of concentration are thus an immediate or potential source 
of inflation because the cost of infrastructures and production factors 
tends to spread t o less-developed regions. Inflation is thus more likely 
in countries wit h the largest number of zones of concentrated economic 
activ ity than in those where economic activity is more evenly spread 
throughout t r.e country . Steps must therefore be taken to disoourage further 
conc~ntratioD in zones where it is already excessive. 
(2) Le$s-developed regions 
14. Inflationary factors in the less-developed regions are linked to 
pressure of demand and the cost of infrastructures. 
Information travels quickly in the different regions of the Community. 
Because of the 'emulation syndrome' the populations of the less-developed 
regions want to have the same standard of living as in urban regions. 
Demand is the refore high and if it is met without a correspondingly high 
level o f prod uction, it is financed by inflation. 
This emu lation s y ndrome is at the basis of wage claims in the less-
developed regions wa:ire, however, average productivity in all sectors 
(agriculture, industries and services) is lowest. 
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15. As regards infrastructures, the less-developed regions are also the 
cause of inflationary tendencies since the cost of infrastructures (roads, 
schools, hospitals, etc) is not always commensurate with the benefits 
involved. 
Where infrastructures are created without a correspondingly high 
level of productive activity, investments may cause inflation. 
16. Regio~al development programmes are therefore needed to ensure 
consistency and coordination in industrial and infrastructural 
investments. 
Implementation of such programmes in accordance with the plan drawn 
up by the Regional Policy Committee has always been regarded by the 
European Parliament as essential if aid is to be granted from the 
European Regional Development Fund to certain projects. 
1 
In paragraph 4 of its resolution of 5 July 1973, basod on a report 
on regional policy by Mr Delmotte, the European Parliament: 
- 'co:-isiders that this .. European sense of responsibility can 
only be created if regional development programmes are 
put in hand to ensure and control the sound management 
of resources'. 
In a fundamental resolution of 21 April 19772 b ased on the Delmotte 
report on a~pects of the Community's regional policy to be developed 
in the future, the European Parliament : 
- 'conaiders it essential to initiate development programmes 
wi~h a view to ensuring such coordination, concentrating 
resources and checking the effective use of aid'. 
17. The above shows that structural and regional imbalances help to 
create or aggravate inflationary tendencies. 
The greater the regional imbalances in an economic sector the 
greater the l:i.kelihood of inflation. The relative intensity of 
regional irlbalances varies considerably from one Member State to 
another, afiecting the value of their respective currencies in 
differing degrees and constituting a major obstacle to the 
aahievement of the monetary objectives pursued by the union. 
1 OJ No. C 62, 31.7.1973, p.33 
2 OJ No. C 118, 16.5.1977, p.118 
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b) Regional imbalances and the economic objectives 
18. The resolution of 22 March 1971 on economic and monetary 
union lays down four objectives, those normally pursued by any 
economic policy: satisfactory growth, full employment, price 
stability and external equilitrium. We shall now consider the 
relationship between each of these four objectives and reqional 
imbalances. 
(1) Satisfactory growth 
19. Regional imbalances constitute an obstacle to growth in 
terms of volume, geographical spread and quality. 
As much of the Community's territory has not yet reached the 
stage of development possible in a modern economy, an enormous 
growth potential in terms of both production and consumption 
remains unused. This potential is all the greater since new 
technica! nnd economic conditions offer development prospects to 
regions in which there was no industry until the beginning of 
the twen~ieth century. 
Moreover, economic and urban over-concentration in some 
zones gives rise to costly infrastructure investments and 
harmful effects that limit growth potential. 
It is therefore essential to make use of the growth potential 
of currentlJ less-developed regions in order to bring the 
volume of growth up to the level possible and avoid losses 
through 0ver-concentration. 
20. This would also have the effect of reducing the technical 
and political vulnerability of the Community's economy which 
tends to be based on a few main types of activity. The 
Community's economic growth must be based on as wide and 
diversified a foundation as its geography allows. 
21. Frcm a human point of view, there must also be a uniform 
geographical spread of activities and, wherever economically 
possible, populations must be allowed to remain where they are. This 
would enable savings to be made through better use of infrastructures. 
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Satisfactory growth means that regional disparities must be reduced to 
the point where each region's economic potential can be exploited in keeping 
with the objectLre of full employment. 
(2) Full employment 
22. Regiona2. imbalances are an obstacle to full employment. From a 
quantitative point of view, the Community countries show a regional employment 
imbalance that is directly related to regional economic disparities. 
There is a large labour force in backward or declining regions that 
cannot find jobs in production whereas before the crisis there was a shortage 
of manpower in the industrialized regions that was usually made good by 
immigrant labou~. 
The obj~~tive of full employment pursued by the economic and monetary 
union is thus very difficult to attain because of the regional imbalances in 
the Community. Backward or declining regions make it difficult to use available 
manpower to the full and the transfer of that manpower is in direct conflict 
with the obj ective of maximum growth when those regions have some development 
potential. 
(3) Stability 
23. Regional imbalances are an obstacle to stability. In Section (a) 
'Regional im~alances and the monetary objective', we showed that, because of 
over-concentration and under-development, regional imbalances jeopardized the 
attainment of the objective of stability of prices and exchange parities. 
Regional imbalances can also be an obstacle to political and social 
stability. Different regional economic structures in the Member States can 
have different effects on the internal socio-political climate that may 
aggravate the effect of economic disparities since the governments may have to 
take special measures which conflict with the objective of coordinated economic 
policies necesaary for the attainment of economic and monetary union. 
(4) Extarnal equilibrium 
24. Regional imbalances are an obstacle to external equilibrium. The effects 
of regional imbalances on growth, full employment and economic stability 
combine to reduce the Community' s international competitivity. 
Moreover, the varying degrees of regional imbalance in the Member States 
affect their productivity and general price levels in different ways. The 
competitive position of each Member State vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
and the other countries of the Community may be damaged as a result. 
Countries witl1 serious regional imbalances may then be forced to take economic 
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policy measu~es to adjust their balance of payments and their currencies 
that prevent the formation of an economic and monetary union. 
(c) Conclusions 
25. The above shows that the varying degrees of regional imbalance in the 
Member States ~opardize the attainment of the monetary and economic 
objectives of economic and monetary union. 
Communjty structural and regional projects must therefore be implemented 
if all the o~jectives of economic and monetary union are to be attained. If 
there is to be a Community regional policy, all national and Community 
policies with regional implications must be coordinated. 
Although some of its aspects constitute a separate policy, regional 
policy must be regarded as the regional dimension of all the other policies 
to be coordinated. 
the Community's and the Member States' financial aid must also be 
coordinated ~nd concentrated on pr iority development objectives. 
The financial resources of the Corrnnunity and of the European Regional 
Development Fund in particular must be considerably increased if regional 
imbalances are to be sufficiently reduced. 
B. The importance of measures for adapting regional structures 
(a) . Public_invest ments_and_underdeveloped_regions: 
an ex~essive burden on some States 
26. The abovementioned internal study by the Directorate-General for Regional 
Policy is too old to enable the scale of the necessary measures to be assessed. 
However, the methodological approach is very interesting. 
Industrialization is considered as likely to have the effect of 
triggering off and supporting a process of economic development. It must, 
however, be sufficiently goncentrated (geographically) and sufficiently 
diversified (s~ctorally) to create the inter-industrial relationships and effect 
the external er.onomies needed for the process of self-development. Development 
poles must be created. 
Industrialization presupposes, on the one hand, the creation of 
industrial activities and thus of jobs and, on the other, the provision of 
infrastructures to back up industrial and related activities and provide 
services for the populations of the regions involved (hospitals, schools,etc). 
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27. The study estimates the private and public investments needed to create 
jobs. 
On the basis of national assessments, estimates have been made of the 
jobs needed per country for the purpose of developing less-developed or 
declining regions up to 1980. The corresponding volume of private investment 
needed has been estimated on the basis of the average cost of creating jobs 
in industry. The public aid needed to encourage the creation of jobs depends 
on the level of development of the various countries . 
28. As regards public investments, expenditure is based on the gross fixed 
capital formation by the public authorities. Such public investment in 
i nfrastructures is needed to meet the needs of the population and provide 
facilities for the region. There is a connection between these two needs and 
expend iture can be evaluated with reference to the number of inhabitants and 
the are as involved. Although the infrastructure provided per krn2 is linked . 
to populatio'1 density, a minimum must be provid€d to ensure that the people 
resident in sparsely populated regions stay there. 
In order to assess the expenditure neoded, the population and area of the 
less-developed regions of each Member State are calculated. The national average 
of gross fixed capital formation by the public authorities is applieq per inhabi-
tant and per Km2 {in France and I1taly where the proportion of less-developed 
regions has a marked effect on the national average, the rates are raised to 
bring them into line with the average rates in the other Community countries). 
(The calculatioP.s were made for the Community of 6). 
29. The study concluded that an amount exceeding the actual expenditure on 
gross fixed ~apital formation would have to be devoted exclusively to the .less-
de vP.l oped regi ons in France and Italy to provide the lnfrastructural investment ~ 
needed to create iobs. 
However, n e ither of these two countries can sacrifice infrastructures in 
developed regions that must remain competi~ive within the Community and help 
to p rovide the resources needed for infrastructures in the less-developed 
regions. In addition, aid is given to private undertakings for the creation 
of j obs. 
(b) Comnunity_approach_and_~~~!~~-~~-~~~--~~~: 
inconsistencies in the Council of Ministers 
30. This increase in public investment in Member States with a large number 
of underdeveloped or declining regions creates budgetary problems with 
repercussions on taxation and, consequently, on prices and incomes. This is 
likely to create distortions incompatible with the functioning of the common 
market and thP. achievement of economic and monetary union. 
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It is h owevt~I e.;~,cnt ial to rest:or.e the balance of the economies in the 
interests of bntl1 internal eguillbrium of the economies of the Member States 
and economic P.quilihriun, of the Community as a whole. 
When the Memher States confirmed their resolve to bring about economic 
and monetary union triey therefore opted for common structur<.tJ. policies by 
means of wh~ch £_onsistent adjustments could be made at Community level. 
Unless the structural adjustment measures are adequate, inflation and the 
slowing-down of growth caused by structural and regional inequalities will 
make European integration no more than a pipe-dream. 
31. ·rhe Comrnunic.:ition on the prospect of economic and monetary union1 
states: 
(c) in crder to facilitate convergence and lay the foundations for 
integration, the coming five-year period should see an increase 
in the financial resources available to the Community in those 
areaa wiwr0. i.t can obtain better results than each of the Member 
Sta tes tuken individually and contribute, via the redistributive 
effect of the Community budget, to the reduction of internal 
imbal2.11ces. Initially, this will apply mainly to: 
- Regional Policy. It is important here that a positive decision 
be takeon on the Commission's proposals concerning the Regional 
FU'1d' • 
32. These Cow.mission proposals followed the suggestions made in the report 
by Mr Delmotte on aspects of the Community's regional policy to be developed 
2 in the future • · 
'rhe mm,t important pojnts include the establishment of' an overall analytical 
and conceptional framework, assessment of the }'.:~ional impact of Community 
policie s, .'.=..oor~i..:}~io~ of the policies and financial instruments of the Community 
and the Member St.ates, the creation of a non-quota section, the broad inter-
pretation of tr-e notion of infrastructure, simplification and acceleration of 
the l!'und' s .12.E.~.::edures and the major role to be assigned to regional development 
prograrrune s. 
These Corrunission proposals were approved by the European Parliament on the 
basis of the report by Mr NOE' 3 
Community r~9ional policy should therefore be something more than a policyto 
support national regional policies. The creation of a non-quota section could 
provide the starting point for a genuine Community policy. 
The Ccunci l of Ministers was to take a decision by 1.1.1978 but still has 
not done so , snm,,ing once age: in its inability to act 
European inte9r."ition, despite the recommendations of 
including the last one in Copenhagen in April 1978 
1. COM (77) 620 final - III A. (c) 
in an area essential to 
several Sununit Conferences 
I 
when: 'the European 
2 Resolution of 24.4.1977 - OJ No. C 118, 16.5.1977, page 51-Doc. 35/77 
3 Resolution of lJ.l0.1977 - OJ No. C 266, 7.11.1977, page 35 - Doc. 307/77 
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Council pointed out that the pursuit of greater internal cohesion 
implying also a reduction in regional imbalances, constitutes one of the key 
objectives of the Community enterprise' (Paragraph 7 of the conclusions of the 
Presidency). 
(c) Economic_and_Monetari_unioh_and _endowment_of_the_ERDF: 
inconsistencies_in_the_Euroeean_Council 
33. As regards the increase in financial resources at the Community's 
disposal, especially for the European Regional Development Fund, reference 
should be made to the working document by Mrs Kellet-Bowman, draftsman of an 
opinion on the endowment of the European Regional Development Fund for 
19791 . 
It appears that there are inconsistencies, not only in the council of 
Ministers but above all in the European Council. The latter has made 
declarations on the attainment of economic union and allocates 'high priority ... 
to the aim of correcting, in the Community, the structural and regional 
imbalances which might affect the realization of economic and monetary union' 
(Paris Summit Conference, October 1972). However, on two occasions sinco 
then, in 1974 and 1977, the European Council has considerably reduced the 
endowments requested by the Commission and supported by the European Parliament 
for the Eurooean Regional Development Fund. 
For the first three years of operation of the European Regional DevelopmEmt 
Fund, the Commission requested 2,250 m u.a.(1,916 m EUA), but the Summit of 
December 1974 reduced the figu:ire to 1,300 mu.a. (1,055 m EUA) . 
For the next three years (1978~1980), the Commission proposed 
3,000 m EUA but the European Council of December 1977 reduced the appropriations 
to 1,850 m EUii. 
34. It shou:1.c be noted that at the meeting of the Committee on Regional 
Policy, Regional Planning and Transport on 20.4.1978, Mrs Kelle t-Bowman 
pointed out that the European Parliament can not be bound by the decisions 
of the European Council otherwise it would lose its right of amendment. 
During the budget debate in 1977, the European Parliament should not 
have agreed to the figure of 580 m EUA proposed by the European Council as 
the endowment for the European Regional Development Fund in 1978 (with the 
addition of a 3ymbolic 1 m EUA). 
1 PE 52. 843/ rnv. 
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To avoid ~-ckash with the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament 
decided again ·~·t ..:he unanimous opinion of its Committee on Regional Policy, 
Regional Plan , ~ng and Transport and against the opinion of its Committee on 
Budgets which 3upported the Commission's proposal of 750 m EUA as the 
endowment of ·, ne European Regional Development Fund in 1978. 
35. The Europe ... n Parliament is thus being as inconsistent as the European 
Council since in i L S resolution it calls for a 'a revival of economic and 
monetary union' b,1t refuses to grant the funds needed to bring this about, 
i.e. , to increar..~ the endowment of the Regional Fund. 
For the ~,71 budget the Regional Fund has in effect been reduced by com-
parison with l ,77, because of the high rate of inflation in the Member States 
since 1974, \-. en the 1977 endowment was fixed. It is to be hoped that the 
Council of Mi .isters and the European Parliament will have learnt their 
lesson in ti~e for the debate on the 1979 budget. 
36. In paragraph .( 6 of the explanatory statoment o f tho rnpor l b y th<J 
Committee on Re~ional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport on aspects or 
the Community's :. egional policy to be developed in the future, Mr Delmotte 
points out that the size of the Regional Fund should not be fixed in advance 
so that: 
'-the E.2!' ibility of increasing the Fund's financial resources 
in the _:uture is left open, 
-democratic control can be exercised over the establishment 
and utilization of these resources'. 
(d) I Overa ' . .L _' - budc;zetar:c aeeroach _ and _McDOUGALL_ reeort 
37. The Commi i:. s:i.cm's communication of 27.2.19781 on the global appraisal of 
the budgetary ry: ·oblems of the Community. which is the subject of a working 
document by Mr . Kellett-Bowman,points out that the Community budget represents 
no more than 2 .. 5% of the national budgets of the Member States and only about 
0.8% of the Conu.mnity's gross domestic product and that almost three quarters 
of the appropria·:; ions are devoted to the common agricultural policy. 
Chapter A, Uen2ral Guidelines, paragraph 1, states that the Community 
budget 'in no way measures up to the role it is required to play towards 
achieving the orje~tive of economic and monetary union and enlargement to 
which the high~' st Community authorities recently again declared themselves 
firmly attache ~' . 
l COM(78) 64 fir~l 
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Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 stress that there is no question of increasing 
national expenditure. On the contrary, 'the development of such Community 
policies should lighten the, load on the national budgets'. 
38. In Chapter C, 'Some repercussions on the 1979 budget', paragraph 6 
st~tes that 'the need already so strongly felt for a substantial increase in 
the financi«l resources earmarked for alleviating the effects of regional 
imbalance is felt even more acutely in the perspective of economic and 
monetary union as well as that of enlargement'. 
The communication conclused that 'much greater financial resources than 
at present planned must be provided' for the Community's regional policy. 
39. The report by the study Group on the role of public finance in European 
integration pr€pared by a group of independent experts set up by the Commission 
under Sir Dcnnld McDougall, notes in its introduction1 that 'a 10 billion 
unit of accc,unt packet could reduce inequalities in living standards between 
Member Statea by about 10% ..• and might be judged an acceptable start'. 
In our view, this report is the essential document in the prospective 
of economic and monetary union. 
This fundamental study is available only in French and English; it 
therefore seems desirable to quote some passages of decisive relevance to 
our subject. 
40. In the introduction, under the heading 'Implications for the future 
role of public finance in the Community' {page 14), the expenditure functions 
which might be carried out to a greater extent at Community level have been 
considered on the basis of the following criteria: 
'First, the case for Community involvement where this can achievt.: 
'economies of scale' ..• 
Secondly, there is a case for Community involvement when developments 
in one part of the Community "spill over" into other parts of it, or 
indeed all of it ••• An important example, internal to the community, .. 
will, in our view, be Community action in the areas of structural and 
cyclical policies (regional, manpower, unemployment) to ensure so far 
1 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, April 1977, last 
paragraph, page 16 
This study consists of two documents: 
- Volume I General Report (76 pages) 
- Volume II individual contributions and working papers (517 pages) 
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as pos&ible that the benefits of closer integration are seen 
to accrue to all, that there is growing convergence - or at least 
not widening divergence - in the economic performance and fortunes 
of Member States. Those measures should make a start in reducing 
the inequalities in per capita incomes between the various parts 
of the area; the situation in the eight countries studied tends to 
confirm that this is a necessary part of economic union. 
Thirdly, we assume that most member governments are reluctant at the 
present time to see any significant increase in total public expenditure 
at all levels - Community, national, state and local - as a percentage 
of gross product.' 
41. Five main directions in which the Community's expenditure might be 
changed are listed under the title 'Changes in the Community's expenditure' 
(page 15), including: 
'(e) It ~sin the area of structural, cyclical, employment and regional 
polici8~ that we see the main need for substantial expenditure at 
Community level. The purpose of these measures is mainly to help to 
reduce inter-regional differences in capital endowment and productivity. 
Our general report sets out a "menu" of six possibilities. 
(i) More Community participation than at present in regional policy 
aids (employment or investment incentives, public infrastructure, 
urban redevelopment). 
(ii) More Community participation than at present in labour market 
policies (including vocational training and other employment measures). 
(iii) A Community Unemployment Fund on the lines suggested in the 
Marjolin Report under which part of the contributions of individuals 
in work would be shown as being paid to the community and part of the 
receipts of individuals out of work as coming from the Community •.. 
(iv) A limited budget equalisation scheme for extremely weak Member 
States tc bring their fiscal capacity up to, say, 65% of the Community 
average a?'.d so ensure that their welfare and public service standards 
are not too far below those of the main body of the Community. 
(v) A system of cyclical grants to local or cegional governments that 
would depend upon regional economic conditions. 
(vi) A "conjunctural convergence facility" aimed at preventing acute 
cyclical problems for weak Member States leading to increasing economic 
divergences. 
We judge t~at a selection from these six possibilities, or variants 
of them, involving budgetary expenditure of the order of 5 - 10 
billion units of account per annum on average could be regarded as 
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beginnin~ to be -~conornically -significant. A 10 billion unit of 
account packet could reduce inequalities in living standards between 
Member States by about 10% ••• 
Where grants are involved in the above possibilities (other than the 
suggested Unemployment Fund) they should be made as cost-effective 
as ,possible. This could involve, for example, the use of 'specific 
purpose matching grants (the Community providing a share of the 
total ccst); having variable matching ratios, e.g. between 80% and 
20% for voorer and richer states or regions so that the money went 
where it was most needed; and possibly the attachement of macro-
economic performance conditions (on inflation, monetary policy, etc.) 
to some of the grants, to increase the likelihood that they would 
increase economic convergence. 
The net cost of the suggestions under (a) - (e) above, allowing 
for savin~s, economies of scale, and mere transfers of expenditure 
from nat:..onal to Community level, as well as for the hopefully 
favourable effects on the growth and stability of the Community's 
gross prcduct, should not increase total public expenditure in the 
Community at all levels as a proportion of real product by much more 
than a percentage point. Allowing for the transfer of expenditure 
from national to Community level, the Community budget might rise 
from 0.7% to around 2 - 2~%.' 
CONCLUSIONS 
42. It should be remembered that the Council of Ministers takes the 
view1 that 
' . . . an eff~ctive policy on regional structures is an essential pre-
requisite to the realization of economic and monetary union'. 
The European Regional Development Fund should intervene to correct 
'the main regional imbalances within the Community which are likely to 
prejudice the attainment of economic and monetary union' (Regulation 
establishing the Fund, Article 6(1) 2 . 
43. The analysis in the first part of this opinion shows that 'the 
varying degrees of regional imbalance in the Member States jeopardize the 
attainment of the monetary and economic objectives of economic and 
monetary ".mion. 
The conclusions of this first part, set out in paragraph 25, are 
that 'Community structural and regional projects must therefore be implemted 
if all the objectives of economic and monetary union are to be attained'. 
1 Regulation (EEC) No. 724/ 75 of the Council of 18 March 1975 establishing 
a European Regional Development Fund, OJ No. L 73, 21.3.1975, p.l 
2 Ibid., p. 3 
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44. In conclusion, if the European Parliament wishes to revive the economic 
and monetary union, it must accept one of the essential prerequisites which 
is a reductic-n in regional imbalances. This reduction has also become one 
of the conditions for the sound functioning of the common market. This 
reduction is not possible without a very substantial increase in the 
1financial resources of the European Regional Development Fund. 
45. Both these aspects are stressed in the motion for a resolution submitted 
on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group. Perhaps more emphasis should 
be placed on the first aspect since, as we showed in chapter A, regional 
imbalances are an obstacle to the attainment of economic and monetary union. 
The second aspect, i.e., increasing the Community's financial resources, 
should be rAgarded as a consequence of the resolve to achieve economic and 
monetary union. 
Paragraph 8 of the motion for a resolution should indicate that, 
. although regional policy has certain aspects which are in effect separate 
policies, it should be regarded as the regional dimension of all the 
policies it coordinates. It is thus the other policies mentioned (industrial 
and craft) that must be compatible with regional polic~ 
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ANNEX IV 
Letter from the chairman of the Committee on Regional Policy, 
Regional Planning and Transport to Mr E. PISANI, chairman of 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Luxembourg, 26 October 1978 
Dear Mr Pisani, 
The Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport 
has been asked to give its opinion to your committee concerning a motion 
for a resolution on economic and monetary union tabled by tile Gronp o f 
European Progressive Democrats (Doc. 209/ 78). 
My co~mittee considered this matter at its meeting of 26 October 1978 
when it co!".cluded that it had nothing which it could usefully add to the 
opinion (PZ 53.661) which Mr DAMSEAUX has already given on a previous 
occasion concerning this matter. 
(sgd)Bruce of Donington 
Present: Lord Bruce of Donington, chairman; Mr Nyborg and Mr McDonald, 
vice-chairmen; Mr Albers, Mr Brosnan, Mr Delmotte, Mr Fuchs, Mr Haase, 
Mr Ibrtlgger, Mrs Kellett-Bowman, Mr Osborn, Mr Schyns and Mr Seefeld. 
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ANNEX V 
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL AFFAIRS, EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION 
Draftsman Mr F. G. van der GUN 
At h:s meeting of 24 January 1978 the Committee on Social Affairs, 
Employment and Education appointed Mr F. G. van der GUN draftsman. 
It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 31 March, 17 May, 
20 October and 2 November 1978 and at the last meeting adopted it by 7 
votes to 2 with 2 abstentions. 
Present: Mr van der Gun, chairman and draftsman; Mrs Dunwoody and 
Mr Pistillo, vice-chairmen; Mr Bertrand, Mr Bouquerel, Mr Dinesen, 
Mr Lezzi, Mr Power, Mrs Squarcialupi, Mr Vandewiele and Mr Wawrzik. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and Education requests the 
committee responsible to incorporate the following conclusions in its motion 
for a resolution: 
1. Is of the opinion that the EMU (EMS) to be established by the Governments 
must ul timately lead to a much more far-reaching alignment of the Member 
States' economic policy and that this alignment can only succeed if it is 
accompanied by greater economic convergence and a reduction in the regional 
and soc ia l disparities between the Community Member States and if it has 
the wholehearted support of the Community's citizens; 
2. Is convinced that this will not be possible in the present social and 
economic situation if the plans for the EMU(EMS) are merely 'backed up by 
a social policy• 1 , but only if the basic objective is recognized from the 
outset a5 an integrated economic, monetary and social policy; 
3. Notes t h at, in contrast to the first Commission document2 , the new 
3 proposal no longer treats social policy as entirely subordinate to the 
need for the smooth functioning of the economy but at least verbally 
acknowledges it to be of equal importance to, and an essential aspect of, 
economic policy; 
4. Nevertheless considers the package of suggestions put forward by the 
Commission in February 1978 to be too restricted and incoherent a basiH 
for att~ining the objective set out in point 2 of these conclusions, since 
they refuain limited by the present legal, financial and budgetary structure 
of the social provisions of the EEC Treaty; 
5. Considers that the social component of the EMU(EMS) should be embodied 
in a long-term programme and that Article 235 of the EEC Treaty should 
consequently be invoked to provide a much broader legal basis for a 
vigorous Community social policy in order to adapt to current objectives 
and specific requirements the means provided for in the 1957 Treaty whi.ch 
have in the meantime been superseded in political and economic terms, to 
which end the means provided for under the ECSC Treaty might also serve as 
a model. 
1 COM(77) 620 final, p.15, subpara.(e) 
2 COM(77) 620 final 
3 COM(78) 52 fir.al 
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6. Considers, moreover, that for the ESF, in the context of EMU(EMS), 
- a considerable transfer of resources to the Fund 
- a fundamental extension of its tasks, and 
- a radical reform of its management structure 
are essential, in particular to safeguard employment, and in general to 
make the Fund serve as the employment fund unmistakably intended in 
l Article 125(1) of the EEC Treaty; draws attention to its repeatedly 
expressed demand that the Commission propose to the Council that the 
Commission, as manager of the Fund, should gradually be granted powers 
to act on its own initiative and, pending this development, expects the 
Commissi~n to continue to propose to the Council, in given cases outside 
the scope of the Fund, special temporary budgetary appropriations for aid 
2 to specific sectors ; 
7. Also considers it urgently necessary for account to be taken at this stage 
of: 
- the need in due course to extend the EMU(EMS) - with particular regard 
to its social aspects - between the present nine Member States to those 
coun~~ies which will shortly be acceding to the Community, and vice-versa; 
the implications of their accession for the EMU(EMS), namely the increase 
in the freedom of movement for workers, the increasing economic and social 
disparities between the northern and southern regions of the enlarged 
Community and so forth. 
1 Parliament's most recent Resolution of 12 May 1977, paragraph 15, OJ No C 133, 
1977 
2 Fisheries sector (Doc. 357/77): Parliament's Resolution of 16 December 1977, 
paras. 47 et seq., OJ No. C 6, 1978; see also Chapter 37 of the Community 
budget, 'Commission' 
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